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Pain Is Enough:
Chronic Pain as Disability
KATHERINE L. MOORE †
ABSTRACT
Both the medical community and the laws of the United
States have historically failed to recognize chronic pain as a
disability. In medicine, chronic pain has gained increasing
recognition as a disability in and of itself, even absent a
current, medically determinable physical impairment. The
law, however, has been slow to catch up. This Article argues
that chronic pain is a disability, even without medical
evidence of an underlying impairment, because of pain’s
significant functional impact on the body and mind. In the
2018 case of Saunders v. Wilkie, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit recognized that “pain is
enough” for a veteran to be eligible for disability
compensation, even when the claimant is unable to establish
a current, underlying cause of their pain. This Article argues
†Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. I am grateful to early
readers of this Article for their suggestions including Jennifer Bennett Shinall,
Jennifer Erkulwater, Matthew Cortland, Doron Dorfman, and the participants
at the 2020 AALS Annual Meeting’s Disability Law Section Panel, Reconsidering
Disability Benefit Programs; Christian Sundquist, Joseph Connors, and the
faculty at Albany Law School’s Spring 2020 Colloquium; and Jennifer Oliva,
Jenny-Brooke Condon, Jon Romberg, Lori Nessel, and the Seton Hall Law School
faculty.
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that Saunders is an important first step in judicial
recognition that chronic pain is a disability, and that
disability benefit programs should recognize and compensate
chronic pain for the disabling condition that it is.
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INTRODUCTION
Although pain is a widespread and highly debilitating
human experience, little attention has been paid to the fact
that chronic pain, on its own, has not been recognized as a
disability under the law. This Article argues that the
physiological and psychological features of chronic pain
make it a disability because of its significant functional
impact on the human body. The Article further argues that
claimants asserting pain as a disability should not be
required to prove that the pain arises from any particular
underlying medical impairment.
Pain has typically been excluded from disability
definitions in the law, including in most disability benefit
programs, because of traditional views of pain as simply a
derivative symptom of other conditions. The recent case of
Saunders v. Wilkie 1 reflects an important change of course.
In the context of the veterans disability benefit compensation
program, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit recognized that pain—standing alone—qualifies as a
disability under Title 28 of the U.S. Code, because it is a
functional impairment.
Melba Saunders was a decorated United States Army
and Persian Gulf War veteran who, by all accounts, served
1. Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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her country honorably throughout her seven-year tour of
service. 2 Following her time in service, she suffered from
continuing knee pain that limited her ability to stand and
walk for extended periods of time, interfering with her ability
to work. 3
Although Ms. Saunders had an underlying condition of a
bilateral knee disorder while she was in service, she was
originally ineligible for veterans disability compensation,
because she did not have a “present disability.” 4 No one
disputed that she had pain. What was in dispute was
whether pain itself is a disability. 5
When Ms. Saunders took her case to the Federal Circuit
in 2018, she successfully argued that her pain, as a
functional impairment, did amount to a disability under the
plain language of the governing statute. 6 As a result, pain is
enough to entitle a veteran to benefits. This Article argues
that other courts should adopt a similar view of pain when
assessing other benefit programs.
Chronic pain is a disability because it has tremendous
functional impact on the body and mind. The functional,
personal, and social impacts of chronic pain should be
sufficient to meet the definition of disability under any of the
legal schemes for disability.
Whether the law recognizes chronic pain as a disability
in and of itself has significant normative and practical
importance because chronic pain is a pervasive condition
affecting 100 million adults in the United States, many of
whom experience negative impacts in participating in life,
work, and society. The majority of those 100 million,

2. Brief for Claimant-Appellant at 1, Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-1466).
3. Id.
4. Saunders, 886 F.3d at 1359.
5. Id. at 1360.
6. Id. at 1364.
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however, cannot access disability benefit programs unless
they also have another qualifying disability. By and large,
their pain is simply not enough. In spite of this conundrum,
few scholars have addressed whether chronic pain alone
warrants protection under disability benefit programs and in
other legal realms such as tort.
This Article argues that certain disabilities are unfairly
privileged in the law because they are objectively provable by
scientific testing. On the other hand, the subjective nature of
disabilities like chronic pain creates an evidence problem for
the courts. This problem extends to mental disabilities and
some sensory and cognitive disabilities, along with
symptoms like fatigue, nausea, and dizziness that often fail
to fall neatly into established medical diagnoses. The
Saunders case identifies the problem and offers some
solutions but does not fully resolve the subjectivity challenge.
The current literature on pain tends to center around the
connection between pain treatment and opioid use—rather
than pain’s status as a disability. Furthermore, the
literature that does acknowledge pain as a disability focuses
on how to build an evidentiary foundation to establish the
condition, such as through neuroscientific advances in
identifying pain, rather than taking on the overarching issue
of subjective disabilities. This Article expands the focus to
examine how chronic pain is treated in the law and to argue
for broader protection of chronic pain as a disability. More
and more, pain is being recognized as a disability within the
medical community, and the law must be responsive to
changing definitions and the expansion of medical
understanding.
Part I examines how various statutory schemes and
benefits programs define chronic pain and identifies the
circumstances under which pain is considered a disability.
Part II analyzes the complexity of disability definitions and
determines that pain is indeed a disability. Part III uses the
case of Saunders v. Wilkie to show that a radical shift in the
law to recognize pain as a disability is possible. Finally, Part
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IV investigates subjective disabilities and inquires whether
broadly allowing evidence of subjective experience is
possible, warranted, and practical. This Article sheds new
light on the neglected issue of chronic pain as a disability.
I.

CHRONIC PAIN: A SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE

Pain is a universal experience among humans. 7 It is also
a highly subjective experience. 8 Whether the same stimulus
produces the same or a different amount or quality of pain
can depend on a wide variety of factors such as individual
bodily structure, experience, race, gender, culture, support,

7. Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 285
(2005).
8. See, e.g., Anke Samulowitz et al., “Brave Men” and “Emotional Women”:
A Theory-Guided Literature Review on Gender Bias in Health Care and Gendered
Norms Towards Patients with Chronic Pain, PAIN RSCH. & MGMT., 2018, at 1
(2018), https://downloads.hindawi.com/journals/prm/2018/6358624.pdf. See also
the International Association for the Study of Pain’s note on the definition of pain:
Pain is always subjective. Each individual learns the application of the
word through experiences related to injury in early life. Biologists recognize
that those stimuli which cause pain are liable to damage tissue.
Accordingly, pain is that experience we associate with actual or potential
tissue damage. It is unquestionably a sensation in a part or parts of the
body, but it is also always unpleasant and therefore also an emotional
experience. Experiences which resemble pain but are not unpleasant, e.g.,
pricking, should not be called pain. Unpleasant abnormal experiences
(dysesthesias) may also be pain but are not necessarily so because,
subjectively, they may not have the usual sensory qualities of pain. Many
people report pain in the absence of tissue damage or any likely
pathophysiological cause; usually this happens for psychological reasons.
There is usually no way to distinguish their experience from that due to
tissue damage if we take the subjective report. If they regard their
experience as pain, and if they report it in the same ways as pain caused
by tissue damage, it should be accepted as pain. This definition avoids tying
pain to the stimulus. Activity induced in the nociceptor and nociceptive
pathways by a noxious stimulus is not pain, which is always a psychological
state, even though we may well appreciate that pain most often has a
proximate physical cause.
Amanda C de C Williams, Making a Definition of Pain Work For Us, INT’L ASS’N
STUDY OF PAIN, https://relief.news/2017/02/02/definition-pain/ (last
visited Dec. 20, 2021).
FOR THE
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and other factors. 9 The section that follows offers a
conception of pain rooted in a critical disability legal studies
analysis, which looks at all impactful aspects of pain—bodily
effects, social and psychological effects, and disparities in
treatment. 10
Pain is also disabling. It affects participation in life,
work, and society. The impact of pain on the ability to work
has a direct impact on the law of benefit programs such as
Social Security, Workers’ Compensation, and Veterans
Disability Benefits. The impact in society might lead to
discrimination in employment or otherwise, giving rise to
lawsuits under the Americans with Disabilities Act. And the
treatment of pain is currently in the crosshairs of a national
debate about the use of opioids and the appropriate legal and
policy decisions related to them.
Pain is one of the most powerful and common signals
from our bodies. Our bodies, when properly functioning , give
us signals: when to eat, when to sleep, etc. And pain in our
bodies gives us a signal, too—to stop doing something—to
avoid touching the hot stove or to stop moving the broken
arm to avoid further injury, for example. Pain is often
functional in that it tells us to start or stop behavior.
The history of how humans think about pain is similar
to the history of how we consider disability. Ancient
philosophers wrote about pain and disagreed about whether
it was “useful” to the sufferer or if it should be avoided. 11
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. Critical Disability Legal Studies focuses on an intersectional analysis of
disability in interplay, especially with race and gender. It also examines how
issues in multiple areas of the law, bioethics, medicine, and technology affect the
legal status and societal position of people with disabilities. See, e.g., Arlene S.
Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do With It or an Introduction
to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 407–16 (2011)
(identifying the area of disability legal studies); Sagit Mor, Between Charity,
Welfare, and Warfare: A Disability Legal Studies Analysis of Privilege and
Neglect in Israeli Disability Policy, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 63, 67–74 (2006).
11. ROSELYNE REY, THE HISTORY OF PAIN 37 (Louise Elliot Wallace et al.
trans., Harvard University Press 1993).
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Medieval church leaders taught that pain was a punishment
from God, just like they taught that disability was a
punishment. 12 Medieval stoics “viewed pain as both a form of
divine retribution, or as a sign of having been especially
chosen and, as such, deserving of rewards in the hereafter.” 13
This mirrors many of the historical beliefs regarding people
with disabilities.
The traditional medical model characterizes pain as a
“simple cause-and-effect problem.” 14 In this view, pain
begins with an injury to a person, resulting in a “nerve
signal” to the spinal cord and then the brain. 15 Once at the
brain, a person feels “a sensation of pain, the severity of
which [is] directly proportional to the tissue injury.” 16 Over
time, perhaps the structure heals on its own or medical
intervention assists. 17 When the tissue injury heals, the pain
recedes, and the person moves on. 18
If the pain does not recede as expected, however, there is
a problem. The traditional medical model posits two
possibilities: either the problem was “overwhelming, such as
rheumatoid arthritis or cancer,” or there was a “character
flaw in the patient.” 19 The conception of an individual flaw is
tied intimately with the medical model of disability,
discussed below in Part II.
As the modern medical era confronted pain, debates
about the utility of pain remained, including disagreement
about the role of intervention. Specifically, physicians
debated whether it was their job to alleviate patients’ pain,
12. Id. at 48–49.
13. Id. at 48.
14. DAVID NAGEL, NEEDLESS SUFFERING: HOW SOCIETY FAILS THOSE
CHRONIC PAIN 32 (2016).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

WITH
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or if pain had value. 20
Today, 100 million adults in the United States suffer
from chronic pain. 21 But, the origins of that pain are widely
varied. Sometimes the cause of pain is obvious, testable, and
relatively uncontroversial. For example, cancer patients,
people with multiple sclerosis, and people with AIDS
frequently experience pain. Rheumatoid arthritis and
fibromyalgia can also cause pain. On the other hand, some
pain, especially some chronic pain, is described as
“unexplained.” 22 Chronic pain can exist even without a prior
injury, through means that are not well-understood. 23
The origin of an individual’s pain can be critically
important in predicting that individual’s success in the legal

20. REY, supra note 11, at 48. Rey discusses the view that pain can have utility
as an “alarm signal” or warning sign for problems that require investigation. Id.
at 275.
21. NAGEL, supra note 14, at 9; INST. OF MED., RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A
BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 302
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books
(2011)
[hereinafter
IOM REPORT],
/NBK91497/.
22. See, e.g., Silvia Maria Lattanzio, The Gadolinium Hypothesis for
Fibromyalgia and Unexplained Widespread Chronic Pain, 129 MED.
HYPOTHESES, Aug. 2019, at 1, 5.
23. From the National Institute of Health’s National Institute of Neurological
Disorders and Stroke, on the definition of chronic pain:
There may have been an initial mishap—sprained back, serious infection,
or there may be an ongoing cause of pain—arthritis, cancer, ear infection,
but some people suffer chronic pain in the absence of any past injury or
evidence of body damage. Many chronic pain conditions affect older adults.
Common chronic pain complaints include headache, low back pain, cancer
pain, arthritis pain, neurogenic pain (pain resulting from damage to the
peripheral nerves or to the central nervous system itself), psychogenic pain
(pain not due to past disease or injury or any visible sign of damage inside
or outside the nervous system). A person may have two or more co-existing
chronic pain conditions. Such conditions can include chronic fatigue
syndrome, endometriosis, fibromyalgia, inflammatory bowel disease,
interstitial cystitis, temporomandibular joint dysfunction, and vulvodynia.
It is not known whether these disorders share a common cause.
Chronic Pain Information Page, NAT’L INST. OF NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS &
STROKE,
https://www.ninds.nih.gov/Disorders/All-Disorders/Chronic-painInformation-Page (last visited Dec. 20, 2021).
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system. For example, in the veterans disability benefits
process, a claimant must be able to prove service-connection,
essentially pointing to evidence in their in-service medical
records showing an inciting cause for their current disability.
If the current disability is chronic pain, what inciting cause
can they point to when their pain is multifactorial and could
have come from any number of sources?
The International Association for the Study of Pain
defines pain as an “unpleasant sensory and emotional
experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage,
or described in terms of such damage.” 24 Pain can start with
a stimulus and has both a “structural” and “neurological”
aspect. 25 There might be an injury that incites the pain, but
the pain might then be amplified by a neurological aspect. 26
Experts now recognize that a wide variety of factors
influence the experience of pain in the individual and the
perception of that pain by medical professionals and lay
people alike. 27 These varied perceptions impact individuals’
ability to receive care and respond to treatment. Indeed, an
individual’s past experiences with pain and its effects, their
prior treatment and interactions with medical professionals,
and whether they have been exposed to others’ pain all
influence how they experience pain. 28 In addition, familial
and genetic factors, including sex and race, influence one’s
experience of pain. 29 Those factors in turn powerfully
determine how pain is treated by medical professionals and
24. Terminology, INT’L ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.iasp-pain.org/terminology?navItemNumber=576#Pain.
25. NAGEL, supra note 14, at 37.
26. Id.
27. INTERAGENCY PAIN RSCH. COORDINATING COMM., NATIONAL PAIN STRATEGY:
A COMPREHENSIVE POPULATION HEALTH-LEVEL STRATEGY FOR PAIN 13–15
[hereinafter IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT], https://www.iprcc.nih.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/NationalPainStrategy_508C.pdf (last visited Dec.
20, 2021).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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how it is viewed by family, friends, and the community.
Finally, comorbidities, cultural background, psychological,
economic, and environmental factors, not to mention the
origin of the pain itself, can also modulate and differentiate
the experience of pain. 30 This complex constellation of factors
can mean that an individual’s subjective perception of their
pain and others’ perception of that pain often differ greatly.
Pain is also a significant public health challenge. 31
Surveys indicate that between 11 percent and 40 percent of
the US population reports some level of chronic pain. 32 In
addition to the 100 million American adults affected by pain,
there is a huge public and private cost. The Institute of
Medicine (IOM) estimates that pain costs society between
$560 and $635 billion annually, and federal and state costs
amount to almost $100 billion annually. 33 The private cost to
quality of life and psychological wellbeing is infrequently
measured, but it is critical to a full understanding of the
impact of pain.
There are significant disparities on both the individual
and societal level that need to be accounted for and
addressed in this public health challenge. For example, pain
is more prevalent and more “disabling,” and care is more
likely to be inadequate for people with limited access to
health care. Racial and ethnic minorities figure prominently
within that category, likely due to disparate treatment. 34
People with low income or education, children, and older
adults are at risk because of low status and access to care. 35
Those at increased risk because of where they live or work,
and those at increased risk because of limited
communication skills, are also more likely to experience the
30. Id. at 13.
31. IOM REPORT, supra note 21.
32. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 13.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id.
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disabling effects of pain. 36 Compounding those disparities
are stigmatization and bias.
Modern conceptions of pain show that it is a highly
subjective and complex condition. Some aspects of pain are
well-understood, and some are not.
A. Acute Pain Is Unpleasant. Chronic Pain Is Disabling.
In order to understand why chronic pain is a disability,
it is important to understand, as much as possible, its full
effects on both the body and mind. Acute pain is more easily
understood, but chronic pain can be confounding—both for
the individual and for those working to help. Broadly
speaking, acute pain is non-controversial in the sense that it
is not regularly challenged or doubted and maintains a fairly
uncontroversial place in the legal system. It is also not
generally considered a disability.
Acute pain can serve an important purpose. It alerts us
to a problem within our body. We can then take steps to
protect that body part, which enables it to heal. Once healing
has occurred and the signal is no longer needed, the pain goes
away. 37 Acute pain is an expected, physiologic response,
normally sudden in onset and time limited. Acute pain
motivates some sort of behavior to protect the body and avoid
actual or potential damage. 38
Chronic pain is different. It does not serve the same type
of useful purpose that acute pain often does. Once healing
has occurred, if it has occurred, the pain persists, even in the
absence of damage. If acute pain motivates potentially
remedial behavior, chronic pain cannot be said to perform a
similar function. There is no protective behavior that would
aid in healing, for example. Chronic pain can be high impact
in that it can cause a substantial disruption of participation
36. Id.
37. Id. at 13.
38. Id. at 11.
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in work, social, and self-care activities. 39 Chronic pain is
typically described as occurring on “at least half the days for
six months or more.” 40
The disabling effects of chronic pain are numerous.
Chronic pain creates a “complex biopsychosocial
phenomenon,” meaning it has the power to affect every
aspect of an individual’s life. 41 The effects can be physical,
mental, and social. The ability to work, engage in social
activities, and maintain physical and mental health are all
impacted by the persistence of pain. 42

39. Id.
40. Id.; see also NAGEL, supra note 14, at 33. Nagel has described the arbitrary
characterizations of acute and chronic pain by “how long they last.” Pain that
lasts less than three months is usually defined as acute pain and pain that lasts
longer as chronic. He notes:
Acute pain is also referred to as nociceptive pain. Nociceptive pain
serves an important purpose. It alerts us to a problem within our body. We
then take steps to protect that body part, which enables it to heal. Once
healing has occurred and the signal is no longer needed, the pain goes away.
Chronic pain does not serve a useful purpose. Once healing has
occurred, the pain persists. It is not serving as a signal, and it unnecessarily
restricts the sufferer. It is considered a disease process in itself and is
referred to as pathological pain. There are two types of chronic pain, which
are not mutually exclusive: inflammatory and neuropathic. Inflammatory
pain results from damage to nonneural tissue, and neuropathic pain results
from damage to neural tissue.
We must make one more very important distinction: between pain and
suffering. Pain is the body’s physical (nociceptive or biological) response to
tissue injury. Suffering is the person’s psychosocial response to the injury.
Id. (emphasis omitted). So-called “diagnostic clusters” of pain for research
purposes include the following: back pain; neck pain; limb/extremity pain,
arthritis disorders, including osteoarthritis and joint pain; fibromyalgia and
wide-spread muscle pain; headache; orofacial, ear, and temporomandibular
disorder pain; abdominal pain and bowel pain; chest pain; urogenital, pelvic, and
menstrual pain; fractures, contusions, sprains and strains; and other painful
conditions, which includes sickle cell disease, complex regional pain syndrome,
systemic lupus erythematosus, acquired deformities (excluding spinal disorders),
spinal cord injury, Lyme disease, and neuropathic pain. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY
REPORT, supra note 27, at 67.
41. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 13.
42. Id.

1484

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

The source of chronic pain can be critically important in
an individual’s ability to access care, be believed, and receive
compensation. Chronic pain can be “primary,” in that it does
not derive from any other condition or injury, or can be
“secondary,” in that it does derive from some other source. 43
Even when chronic pain is secondary, it might be out of
proportion with the initial injury or condition. For example,
when an initial injury heals but the pain “chronifies” or
continues to persist. 44 Another type of secondary chronic
pain is where there is a persistent, peripheral disease, an
effect of which is chronic pain. Examples of this type of
chronic pain are irritable bowel syndrome or advanced
arthritis. In those cases, the peripheral disease itself causes
some of the pain, but additional pain is caused by
“neurologically altered pain perception.” 45 There is also a
bounce-back effect where pain impacts life in certain ways,
which in turn impact and worsen pain. Psychosocial and
physical problems that result from pain can, in turn, make
pain worse, and the threats to health and well-being can
escalate. 46
The aspects of chronic pain described above provide a key
piece of the explanation for why the law should recognize it
as a disability. The impacts of persistent or chronic pain are
truly life and death. Chronic pain has been linked to
premature death, and the challenges associated with living
with chronic pain contribute to a higher suicide rate than
that of the general population. 47 Given these impacts,
43. A.C. Pustilnik, Imaging Brains, Changing Minds: How
Neuroimaging Can Inform the Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1099, 1114 (2015).

Pain

44. Id.
45. Id. at 1115. There is also research to suggest that chronic pain is a central
nervous system disorder, which would help to “explain the distress and match
the symptomology of many forms of chronic pain.” Id.
46. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 13.
47. Id.; see also NAGEL, supra note 14, at 244. Nagel indicates that there was
a rise in drug-related suicides from 2005 to 2009. While the “assumption was that
these incidents were merely due to substance abuse,” that is not necessarily
accurate, since “the government researchers made no attempt to determine how
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understanding whether pain is chronic or acute is critical to
understanding pain as a disability.
B. Disparate Treatment in the Measurement of Pain
To assess how disability law should account for pain
necessarily raises the question of how to measure pain, and
following that, how to compensate for it. That question is
fraught. How an individual experiences pain is a personal
and individualized experience, but it has broad implications.
The severity of pain impacts the response to that pain from
both a medical and social perspective. Bias and prejudice
about groups’ perceived ability to feel and endure pain
impacts not only the treatment provided but also the mental
health and well-being of the individual.
Pain is, by its nature, subjective. 48 While pain scales may
appear objective, an individual’s perception of their own pain
level can vary widely from another’s. 49 Chronic pain is a
many people attempting suicide in this manner were suffering from chronic,
unresolved pain.” Id. There is reason to believe at least some of them might have
suffered from chronic, unresolved pain, because
risk factors for suicide in the pain population are high. A 2004 study found
that 19 percent of pain patients studied had passive ideas about suicide, 13
percent had active thoughts, 5 percent had a plan, and 5 percent had made
a previous attempt. Seventy-five percent identified drug overdose as their
preferred method for suicide.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. Samulowitz et al., supra note 8, at 1.
49. For an example of a pain scale, see the Faces Pain Scale, developed for
children, from the International Association for the Study of Pain. Faces Pain
Scale–Revised (FPS–R), INT’L ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN, https://www.iasppain.org/Education/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1519 (last visited Dec. 20, 2021).
The guidelines included with this scale instruct medical professionals to utilize
it as follows: “In the following instructions, say ‘Hurt’ or ‘Pain,’ whichever seems
right for a particular child: These faces show how much something can
hurt. This face [point to left-most face] shows no pain. The faces show
more and more pain [point to each from left to right] up to this one.
[point to right-most face] It shows very much pain. Point to the face
that shows how much you hurt [right now]. Score the chosen face 0, 2, 4,
6, 8, or 10, counting left to right, so ‘0’ = ‘no pain’ and ‘10’ = ‘very much pain.’ Do
not use words like ‘happy’ or ‘sad.’ This scale is intended to measure how children
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“moving target” in that it can change constantly. 50 On an
individual basis, each person’s pain is unique. 51
Measuring the severity of pain is a key component of
disability law, in benefit programs and tort especially. There
are key differences between how individuals experience pain,
along with a load of cultural norms and assumptions. There
are also differences in how physicians perceive that their
patients experience pain, informed by biases about gender,
race, and other characteristics. Measuring pain is not simple,
nor is it necessarily objective. This fact frustrates people’s
ability to access quality medical care and receive appropriate
therapeutic responses to pain. It also complicates how the
law treats pain for purposes of compensation and rating,
because the amount of pain someone has will be tied to their
level of disability or level of damages in tort, for example.
Courts, adjudicators, and raters may desire a
measurement derived from X-rays, MRIs, or other visual
evidence, but these are often irrelevant when looking for
corroborating evidence of pain. 52 Pain may not be tied to a
feel inside, not how their face looks.” Id. For other examples of pain scaling tools,
see Erica Jacques, 10 Common Types of Pain Scales, VERYWELLHEALTH,
https://www.verywellhealth.com/pain-scales-assessment-tools-4020329 (Dec. 19,
2021).
50. NAGEL, supra note 14, at 38. Nagel notes that chronic pain is challenging
because of its uniqueness to the individual. He notes that “[e]ach person brings
different intrinsic and extrinsic factors to the pain experience. Each person
processes the sensory experience of pain differently, with very different outcomes.
Each patient must therefore be treated individually. . . . For these reasons, we
cannot understand another person’s pain based on our own experiences.” Id.
Furthermore, as to the psychological aspect, he cautions “[w]hile chronic pain
may be pathological, it is physiologically real. It is not a character flaw or a purely
psychological problem. Psychological dysfunction in those who suffer is most
often the result of chronic pain, not the reverse.” Id.
51. Id. at 28. Nagel also notes the factors playing a role in pain perception,
“such as past pain experience, stress level, mood, supportiveness of the
environment, and so on. Culture and heredity are also important.” Id. at 37.
Furthermore, Nagel notes that the origins and development of pain can be
complex, in that “[s]tructural injury may incite the pain, but a neurological
adaptation or maladaptation maintains or amplifies it. Treatments that attend
only to the structural element are bound to fail in chronic pain.” Id.
52. See, e.g., David Borsook et al., Neuroimaging
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visible problem at all. 53
The measurement of pain is of great importance, because
it can dictate treatment and standard of care. Research
suggests that there are substantial racial disparities in the
treatment of pain, for example. 54 Racial bias plays a large
role in the perception of pain measurement. Black Americans
in particular are “systematically undertreated” for pain in

Therapeutic Approaches to Chronic Pain, MOLECULAR PAIN, Jan. 1, 2007, at
2; A. Lee Dellon et al., Treatment of the Painful Neuroma by Neuroma
Resection and Muscle Implantation, 77 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY
427, 434 (1986); Ronald Melzack et al., Central Neuroplasticity and Pathological
Pain, 933 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 157, 162–63 (2001); Sean C. Mackey & Fumiko
Maeda, Functional Imaging and the Neural Systems of Chronic Pain, 15
NEUROSURGERY CLINICS N. AM. 269, 269–70 (2004); Stephen E. Gwilym et al.,
Psychophysical and Functional Imaging Evidence Supporting the Presence of
Central Sensitization in a Cohort of Osteoarthritis Patients, 61 ARTHRITIS CARE &
RES. 1226, 1226 (2009); Task Force on Chronic Pain Management and the
American Society of Regional Anesthesia and Pain Medicine, AM. SOC’Y OF
ANESTHESIOLOGISTS, Practice Guidelines for Chronic Pain Management,
112 A NESTHESIOLOGY 810 (2010); Arne May, Chronic Pain May Change the
Structure of the Brain, 137 PAIN 7, 8–9 (2008). See generally Anil Kuchinad et
al., Accelerated Brain Gray Matter Loss in Fibromyalgia Patients:
Premature Aging of the Brain?, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4004 (2007).
53. See Pustilnik, supra note 43, at 1105.
54. See, e.g., Karen O. Anderson et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain:
Causes and Consequences of Unequal Care, 10 J. PAIN 1187, 1198 (2009); Vence
L. Bonham, Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Treatment: Striving to Understand the
Causes and Solutions to the Disparities in Pain Treatment, 29 J. LAW MED. &
ETHICS 52, 52 (2001); Alexie Cintron & R. Sean Morrison, Pain and Ethnicity in
the United States: A Systematic Review, 9 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1454, 1455 (2006);
Charles S. Cleeland et al., Pain and Treatment of Pain in Minority Patients with
Cancer: The Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group Minority Outpatient Pain
Study, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 813, 813 (1997); Harold P. Freeman & Richard
Payne, Racial Injustice in Health Care, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1045, 1045–46
(2000); Monika K. Goyal et al., Racial Disparities in Pain Management of
Children With Appendicitis in Emergency Departments, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS
996, 1001 (2015); Carmen R. Green et al., The Unequal Burden of Pain:
Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain, 4 PAIN MED. 277, 278 (2003);
Vickie L. Shavers et al., Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Among the U.S. Adult
Population, 21 J. HEALTH CARE FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 177, 179 (2010); INST.
OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH CARE passim (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson
eds., 2003); Todd H. Knox et al., Ethnicity and Analgesic Practice, 35 ANNALS
EMERGING MED. 11, 14 (2000).
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the United States relative to their white counterparts. 55 In
both the lay and medical contexts, racial bias is related to
false, prejudicial beliefs. 56
Furthermore, the underlying racial biases dictate
inaccurate and damaging beliefs about biological differences.
One study found that white laypeople and medical students
and residents “believe that the black body is biologically
different—and in many cases, stronger—than the white
body.” 57 That study also found evidence that these beliefs
about the biological differences between white and black
bodies were “associated with racial bias in perceptions of
others’ pain, which in turn predict accuracy in pain
treatment and recommendations.” 58 Racial biases are
therefore not just passively present: they have an impact on
treatment and the perception of severity. That severity
component has a key relationship to the law.
These biases also have an enormous real-world impact.
A physician’s perception of their patient’s pain will dictate
whether the patient is prescribed pain medication and the
prescribed dosage of that medication. If that initial
perception of pain is rooted in bias, it will be an incorrect
perception, resulting in inaccurate diagnoses and incorrect
treatment. For example, black patients are less likely to
receive painkillers for broken bones in the emergency room
relative to white patients, even when the injuries and selfreports of pain are similar. 59 These disparities in treatment
persist even among young children. For example, “a study of
nearly one million children diagnosed with appendicitis
revealed that, relative to white patients, black patients were

55. Kelly M. Hoffman et al., Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment
Recommendations, and False Beliefs About Biological Differences Between Blacks
and Whites, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 4296, 4296 (2016).
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Knox et al., supra note 54, at 11–12.
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less likely to receive any pain medication for moderate pain
and were less likely to receive opioids—the appropriate
treatment—for severe pain.” 60
Furthermore, research shows that these disparities are
“likely not the result of racist individuals acting in racist
ways.” 61 This means that the biases are pervasive and
structural, not just attributable to “bad apples.”
Gender bias, too, plays a role in the disparate treatment
of patients’ pain. A large body of research shows that gender
norms about male and female responses to pain impact
treatment. Women make up the majority of chronic pain
diagnoses, but women often receive less intervention even
when they report more pain. 62
Research shows that men and women perceive pain
differently. 63 They also describe and express it differently. 64
The coping strategies they use are different. 65 Men and

60. Hoffman et al., supra note 55, at 4296; see also Goyal et al., supra note 54,
at 999.
61. Hoffman et al., supra note 55, at 4297.
62. See, e.g., Samulowitz et al., supra note 8, at 10.
63. See id. at 1; see, e.g., Roger B. Fillingim et al., Sex, Gender, and Pain: A
Review of Recent Clinical and Experimental Findings, 10 J. PAIN 447, 470 (2009);
Joel D. Greenspan et al., Studying Sex and Gender Differences in Pain and
Analgesia: A Consensus Report, 132 PAIN S26, S27 (2007); Robert W. Hurley &
Meredith C. B. Adams, Sex, Gender, and Pain: An Overview of a Complex Field,
107 ANESTHESIA & ANALGESIA 309, 310 (2008); Sónia F. Bernardes et al., Bridging
the Gap Between Pain and Gender Research: A Selective Literature Review, 12
EUR. J. PAIN 427, 427 (2008); E. J. Bartley & R. B. Fillingim, Sex Differences in
Pain: A Brief Review of Clinical and Experimental Findings, 111 BRIT. J.
ANAESTHESIA 52, 56 (2013); Edmund Keogh, Sex and Gender Differences in Pain:
A Selective Review of Biological and Psychosocial Factors, 3 J. MEN’S HEALTH &
GENDER 236, 241 (2006).
64. See, e.g., Arthur J. Barsky et al., Somatic Symptom Reporting in Women
and Men, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 266, 268 (2001).
65. See Mélanie Racine et al., A Systematic Literature Review of 10 Years of
Research on Sex/Gender and Pain Perception—Part 2: Do Biopsychosocial
Factors Alter Pain Sensitivity Differently in Women and Men?, 153 PAIN 619, 628
(2012).
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women also respond to particular treatments differently. 66
There are biological and hormonal differences that may
account for some variation, but social factors also play a
role. 67 Specifically, “boys and girls are socialized along
gender norms for how to respond to pain. . . . [B]oys and men
are taught to be tough, tolerate pain, and sustain painful
experiences, while girls and women are socialized to be
sensitive, careful, and to verbalize discomfort.” 68 Physicians
may dismiss women’s pain more than they do men’s, and
evidence shows that women’s pain is “often less thoroughly
investigated, especially initially, when the cause of pain is
unknown.” 69 Doctors are less likely to believe women when
they report their pain. This may be linked to the crisis in
maternal mortality in the United States. 70
Critically, the intersection of race and gender means that
black women in particular in the United States are often
dismissed when reporting pain. 71 This can have drastic
health consequences. Black women have worse health
outcomes than white women. They are forty percent more
likely to die from breast cancer, more likely to die from
cancer generally, less likely to receive pain medication, and
66. See id. at 630–31; Bartley & Fillingim, supra note 63, at 52.
67. Cynthia D. Myers et al., Psychosocial Contributions to Sex-Correlated
Differences in Pain, 19 CLINICAL J. PAIN 225, 230 (2003).
68. Samulowitz et al., supra note 8, at 1–2.
69. Consumer Reps., Is Bias Keeping Female, Minority Patients from Getting
Proper Care for Their Pain?, WASH. POST (July 29, 2019), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/health/is-bias-keeping-female-minority-patients-from-gett
ing-proper-care-for-their-pain/2019/07/26/9d1b3a78-a810-11e9-9214-246e594de
5d5_story.html; see also Laura Kiesel, Women and Pain: Disparities in
Experience and Treatment, HARV. MED. SCH.: HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/women-and-pain-disparities-inexperience-and-treatment-2017100912562.
70. See generally The U.S. Maternal Health Crisis: 14 Numbers You Need to
Know, AMNESTY INT’L (May 3, 2011), https://www.amnestyusa.org/the-u-smaternal-health-crisis-14-numbers-you-need-to-know/
(“African-American
women are 3 to 4 times as likely to die from pregnancy-related causes as white
women.”).
71. Consumer Reps., supra note 69.
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more likely to die of heart disease at a younger age than
white women. 72 For example, black women are less likely
than white women to undergo genetic testing for breast
cancer, because physicians are less likely to recommend it to
them. 73 Unequal health care drives this disparity.
These healthcare disparities exist on an individual
patient-provider level, but also structurally. 74 Interventions
to reduce disparities “fail” when the problem is viewed only
through the lens of individual interactions and the race of
individual actors within the system. 75 Black women, for
example, face pervasive stereotypes and disparities in health
care settings and in general. 76
These disparities persist at all stages of the pain
experience, from the onset of pain to its diagnoses,
treatment, and outcome. And they track on to the law,
because they dictate how the courts evaluate an individual’s
benefits application or a plaintiff’s claim.
C. The Impact of Stigma and the Impact of Pain on the
Mind
Chronic pain’s impact on the mind, and in particular on
mental health outcomes, is important to understanding its
role as a disability. Because these effects can be
overwhelming, the degree to which they are understood will
72. Erika Stallings, This Is How the American Healthcare System Is Failing
Black Women, OPRAH DAILY (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.oprahdaily.com/life
/health/a23100351/racial-bias-in-healthcare-black-women/.
73. Anne Marie McCarthy et al., Health Care Segregation, Physician
Recommendation, and Racial Disparities in BRCA1/2 Testing Among Women
with Breast Cancer, 34 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2610, 2613–14 (2016).
74. See TINA K. SACKS, INVISIBLE VISITS: BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS WOMEN IN THE
AMERICAN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 5–6 (2019).
75. Id. at 5; see also JONATHAN M. METZL, THE PROTEST PSYCHOSIS: HOW
SCHIZOPHRENIA BECAME A BLACK DISEASE 202 (2009).
76. Tina K. Sacks, Performing Black Womanhood: A Qualitative Study of
Stereotypes and the Healthcare Encounter, 28 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 59, 60
(2018).
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help to show why chronic pain is disabling.
The effects of chronic pain are not limited to physical
impacts. Chronic pain is often accompanied by posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), for example, which can develop after
the onset of chronic pain or be exacerbated by it. 77
Furthermore, the stigma that chronic pain patients
experience can be disabling in itself. 78 There are negative
attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and misconceptions about
people experiencing pain and about the nature of pain. 79
These attitudes can be held by clinicians, other medical
professionals, social workers, program administrators, and
others in decision-making roles, meaning that these
attitudes can disparately impact patient care and
treatment. 80
Pervasive stigma and misconceptions about pain have a
77. NAGEL, supra note 14, at 44–45 (writing about PTSD and its relationship
to chronic pain, noting that “[p]osttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an
underappreciated accompaniment of chronic pain, and it plays a role in many
ways. . . . In effect, it backs the pain patient into a corner, and . . . has the
potential to amplify and perpetuate the response to pain. PTSD in pain patients
is often ignored. Yet failure to acknowledge and treat it can have negative effects
on outcome. I have observed four different types of PTSD in the setting of chronic
pain. First, PTSD can precede the pain disorder, as for the many chronic pain
patients who have a history of physical, verbal, or sexual abuse. . . . Second, pain
patients can experience posttraumatic stress related to the event that brought on
their pain. . . . While some would characterize this behavior as malingering, it is
the result of a very real anxiety disorder that needs to be respected and treated
as a separate entity if rehabilitation is to be successful. Third, PTSD occurs in
those whose trauma is the result of abuse by insurance companies, the courts,
attorneys, or the workplace. . . . Fourth, the trauma may be inflicted by the
medical system.”).
78. See IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 29.
79. See id.; Dennis C. Turk et al., Treatment of Chronic Non-Cancer Pain, 377
LANCET 2226, 2227 (2011); Vani A. Mathur et al., Racial Bias in Pain Perception
and Response: Experimental Examination of Automatic and Deliberate Processes,
15 J. PAIN 476, 477 (2014); Raymond C. Tait & John T. Chibnall, Racial/Ethnic
Disparities in the Assessment and Treatment of Pain, 69 AM. PSYCH. 131, 132
(2014); Stephen J. Bekanich et al., A Multifaceted Initiative to Improve Clinician
Awareness of Pain Management Disparities, 29 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 388, 388
(2014).
80. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 29.
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real-world impact on treatment and care. 81 In its
recommendations
regarding
public
education
and
communication,
the
Interagency
Pain
Research
Coordinating Committee (IRPCC) Pain Strategy Report
recommends the following steps, among several, to address
stigma:
• Increase public awareness and knowledge about the
pervasiveness of chronic pain, its complexity, and the importance
of access to prompt and effective treatments.
• Change cultural attitudes about chronic pain, debunking
stereotypes and myths related to people with chronic pain and
various pain treatment options and emphasizing the value of
pain self-management programs in enabling people to live better
with chronic pain. 82

The impacts on treatment and care can be vast. The
IPRCC Pain Strategy Report notes that “[p]eople with pain
who encounter these biases can feel stigmatized, which may
decrease their willingness to report pain in a timely way,
participate in decisions about their care, adhere to a
recommended treatment plan, or follow a self-care protocol.
This perception also may negatively affect their
psychological state.” 83 People experiencing chronic pain who
also experience bias or stigma will, simply put, be worse off.
Members of vulnerable populations are most at risk of
experiencing the negative effects of stigma. 84 For example,
research has documented the particular stigma against
women with chronic fatigue syndrome. 85 Similar patterns

81. See id. at 46.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 29. See also NAGEL, supra note 14, at 50, on stigma, noting that
“[w]e shun chronic pain patients as though they were lepers. . . . [T]hey are
sometimes treated almost like criminals, as if they are deliberately fabricating
their ailments. As a society, we deny these patients not only medical care but jobs
as well.”
84. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 29.
85. Id.

1494

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

exist for people who are prescribed opioids for chronic pain. 86
Other groups, like non-verbal children who cannot
communicate in traditional ways, experience stigma. 87
Furthermore, when there is an underlying disease such as
sickle cell disease or HIV, the patients experiencing pain
related to these conditions experience increased stigma. 88
These are just a few of the groups and vulnerable populations
for whom stigma impacts the experience and treatment of
pain.
Meanwhile, medical professionals may be underequipped to deal with these challenges. Many physicians, for
example, do not have the requisite skills and knowledge to
“contribute to the cultural transformation in the perception
and treatment of people with pain.” 89 Practitioners are more
likely to rely on siloed approaches in procedure and
pharmacology that may not be effective alone, and lack the
core competencies in pain care and management that would
provide comprehensive knowledge and understanding. 90
Moreover, cultural bias against people with pain,
generally, and those with chronic pain, particularly, impacts
how individual medical professionals respond to pain. 91
Research shows that as medical training progresses, bias
emerges and empathy declines. 92
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 41.
90. See id.
91. Hoffman et al., supra note 55, at 4296. See generally Richard L. Nahin,
Estimates of Pain Prevalence and Severity in Adults: United States, 2012, 16 J.
PAIN 769 (2015) (discussing associations between pain severity and selected
demographic variables including race, ethnicity, preferred language, sex, and
age).
92. See Melanie F. Neumann et al., Empathy Decline and Its Reasons: A
Systematic Review of Studies with Medical Students and Residents, 86 ACAD.
MED. 996, 1001 (2011); Christina Amutah et al., Misrepresenting Race—The Role
of Medical Schools in Propagating Physician Bias, 384 NEW ENG. J. MED. 872, 872
(2021).
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Bias, stigma, and mental health impact the experience,
treatment, and outcomes for chronic pain. Like disparate
treatment, individuals experiencing these effects will
ultimately be disfavored in the legal system as a result.
D. Pain Treatment
The “Opioid Epidemic” in the United States has
drastically changed how medical professionals treat pain.
This development also impacts how the general public views
chronic pain. It has impacts both for opioid users and nonopioid users alike. 93
How pain is treated can have a direct impact on its legal
status, because it can allow courts to make inferences about
the severity of pain on the basis of its treatment. For
example, if a physician does not prescribe an opioid to treat
an individual’s pain, it could be inferred that the pain was
not particularly disabling, even if that failure to prescribe a
particular treatment was based on another factor like bias,
stigma, discrimination, or fear of prosecution due to opioid
restrictions.
The racial disparities referred to above in the diagnosis
and rating of pain carry over here too. While there is evidence
of over-prescription of pain medication for white patients,
there is similar evidence of under-prescription for black
93. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic:
White Privilege and the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133
HARV. L. REV. 770, 787 (2020); Roseann B. Termini & Rachel-Malloy Good, 50
Years Post-Controlled Substances Act: The War on Drugs Rages On with Opioids
at the Forefront, 46 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2019); What is the U.S. Opioid
Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/opioids
/about-the-epidemic/index.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2021); NAGEL, supra note 14,
at 241, on opioid use and tolerance versus dependence (“Tolerance occurs when
more medication is needed to achieve the same effect. Dependency occurs when
abstinence from the drug results in a withdrawal state. . . . Addiction occurs
when someone compulsively engages in a behavior despite negative consequences
to herself or those around her; in this case, compulsive use of pain medication.
Pseudoaddiction occurs when a person seeks to obtain a substance illegally or
inappropriately to treat a legitimate problem that is not being properly managed
by health-care professionals.” (emphasis omitted)).
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patients. 94 Viewing chronic pain from a public health and
disability perspective allows the public health knowledge
and disease models to add precision to the concept of pain
prevention and treatment. 95 The purpose of a broad public
health approach is to not only reduce individual experiences
of pain but to reduce the impact of pain on individuals,
families, and society as a whole. 96
Nonetheless, there have been significant public health
concerns related to the misuse or diversion of prescription
opioid pain medications. The risk for dependence and
overuse related to long-term opioid prescribing adds to the
complexity. 97 The public health challenge has been to
balance efforts to improve pain management with efforts to
manage the rise in adverse health consequences related to
opioid use. 98
The number of opioid prescriptions dispensed increased
from 76 million in 1999 to 219 million in 2011, 99 peaking at
255 million in 2012 and settling back down to 168 million in
2018—more than double what it was 20 years prior. 100 While
the number increased, so did the amount per prescription,
the duration of the supply, and the cumulative dose. 101 At the
same time, there was a rise in opioid-related substance abuse
treatment admissions, and a rise in opioid-involved overdose
deaths. 102
As concerns about opioid prescription rise and new
94. Hoffman et al., supra note 55, at 4296.
95. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 14.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. U.S. Opioid Prescribing Rate Maps, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-maps.html (Nov.
10, 2021).
101. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 14.
102. Id.
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programs endeavor to curb prescribing, simultaneous
concerns persist about use and access to these drugs for
appropriate and quality pain management. Oftentimes,
opioids are simply the best option for pain management. For
individual patients, opioids can be the only intervention to
have any appreciable effect. 103 By contrast, pharmacy
shortages, regulated dispensing, and other regulatory
measures can result in inadequate pain treatment. 104 Most
patients who use opioids use them without dependency. 105
Nevertheless, primary care physicians, who are the majority
treatment providers for chronic pain patients, report their
reluctance to prescribe opioids for non-cancer pain, because
they are concerned about dependence, addiction, and
abuse. 106
Debates about the appropriate use of opioids to treat
pain overshadow other critical issues in pain management.
For example, ensuring access to “high-quality integrated
care based on clinical evidence” is a challenge. 107
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See David A. Fishbain et al., What Percentage of Chronic Nonmalignant
Pain Patients Exposed to Chronic Opioid Analgesic Therapy Develop
Abuse/Addiction and/or Aberrant Drug-Related Behaviors? A Structured
Evidence-Based Review, 9 PAIN MED. 444, 452, 454 (2008). See generally Michael
F. Fleming et al., Substance Use Disorders in a Primary Care Sample Receiving
Daily Opioid Therapy, 8 J. PAIN 573 (2007).
106. Holly Blake et al., Prescribing Opioid Analgesics for Chronic NonMalignant Pain in General Practice—A Survey of Attitudes and Practice, 9 BRIT.
J. PAIN 225, 226 (2015); Robert N. Jamison et al., Beliefs and Attitudes About
Opioid Prescribing and Chronic Pain Management: Survey of Primary Care
Providers, 10 J. OPIOID MGMT. 375, 376 (2014); Esmond D. Nwokeji et al.,
Influences of Attitudes on Family Physicians’ Willingness to Prescribe LongActing Opioid Analgesics for Patients with Chronic Nonmalignant Pain, 29
CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2589, 2590 (2007).
107. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 35. These challenges
include: pain management limited to one modality (only pharmacological
treatment, for example); uncoordinated care; care not aligned with the best
available evidence or expected outcomes; care provided by primary care
practitioners without specialized expertise; lack of quality research on the
effectiveness of interventions; lack of knowledge about models of care delivery;
lack of drug research on safe alternatives to opioids; lack of prevention programs
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Multidisciplinary treatment for chronic pain, in a center or
clinic setting, can be effective in providing care that is
coordinated, delivered in a programmed and patientcentered manner, evidence-based, and provided with pain
management expertise. 108
Nevertheless, there are significant structural barriers to
fully addressing pain on both an individual and population
level. There are disincentives to pain management. These
include insurance companies that “refuse to pay for pain
medication” even after a valid prescription and includes
medical training that does not sufficiently involve the
management of pain. 109
II. PAIN AS DISABILITY
A. Disability: Defined, Disputed
The definition of disability—what it refers to, what it
does not, and what aspects of the definition are important—
is disputed. Scholars use many different terms to describe
and define disability, some of which are discussed here.
Disability can be an impairment of some particular function.
Some scholars take a more neutral terminology and use the
term characteristic or trait, rather than disability. On the
medical side, disabilities are frequently referred to as
conditions or diagnoses. Some scholars take a functional
approach and refer to bodily function or body structure.
and services; lack of funding and payment for pain self-management programs;
lack of family and community or social services support; inadequate patient
education on the biopsychosocial effects of pain; value-driven approaches rather
than integrative health approaches; lack of access to and the affordability of pain
medication; and limiting approaches such as rationing, medication shortages,
and inadequate insurance and payment procedures. Id. at 35–36.
108. See, e.g., Recommendations for Pain Treatment Services, INT’L ASS’N FOR
STUDY OF PAIN, https://www.iasp-pain.org/Education/Content.aspx?Item
Number=1381 (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
THE

109. DORIS JAMES FLEISCHER & FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT: FROM CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION 136 (2d ed. 2011).
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Referring to societal impact, disability is sometimes defined
in terms of participation in, and restriction from, society,
work, and life. 110
For the impact of disability, one or more disabilities
might affect a person’s movement, vision, hearing, thinking,
learning, mental health, memory, communication, or social
relationships. Some disabilities are frequently described
purely in terms of a physical impairment and body structure,
while some are more commonly defined in terms of functional
limitations—what a person is or is not able to do—rather
than body structure. Some disabilities only affect one
dimension (vision, for example), while some affect multiple.
There is, as should be clear by now, an extremely wide
variety of disability definitions. 111
In the broadest of terms, the majority of disability
definitions contain the following two pieces in common: “a
physical or mental characteristic labeled or perceived as an
impairment or dysfunction” 112 and “some personal or social
limitation associated with that impairment.” 113
Furthermore, the classification of a physical or mental
variation as an impairment may be statistical, based on the
average in some reference groups; biological, based on a
theory of human functioning; or normative, based on a view
of human flourishing. However classified, impairments are
generally seen as traits of the individual that he or she
cannot readily alter. 114
110. David Wasserman et al., Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience, in
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2016 ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/disability/.
111. Id.
112. Id. The authors note that “in the remainder of this entry, we will refer to
such characteristics as ‘impairments,’ without assuming the objectivity or
validity of that label.” Id. I will do the same.
113. Id.
114. Id. The definition goes on: “
Just what makes a condition a trait or attribute of an individual is obscure
and debatable, but there seems to be agreement on clear cases . . . . Thus,
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The take-away here is that, for most scholars, disability
can be defined as an impairment that cannot be changed and
that results in some limitation. Beyond that, there is little
commonality that can encompass every disability that is
indisputably included in any definition, let alone those that
create controversy like chronic pain.
People with disabilities were not considered a distinct
group until the nineteenth century, when early
categorizations of “normality” and “abnormality” or
“deviance” became prominent. 115 Prior to this time,
disabilities were thought of as part of variations in the
human function and form. 116 Generalizations and
classifications on the basis of perceived or inferred
characteristics in the case of disability, and definitions of
who “counts” as disabled, are, therefore, relatively new. 117
Consider the large number of impairments,
characteristics, and traits that may plausibly be included in
any definition of disability: paraplegia, deafness, blindness,
diabetes, autism, epilepsy, depression, HIV, congenital
absence or adventitious loss of a limb or a sensory function,
multiple sclerosis, arteriosclerosis (a chronic disease),
inability or limited ability to perform cognitive functions like
memorization and calculations, schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder, cancer, and so many more. 118
The range of difference captured by any definition of
disability is as wide as the difference between disabled and
poverty is not seen as an impairment, however disabling it may be, nor is
tasteless clothing, even if it is a manifestation of impaired fashion-sense
rather than scarce income. On the other hand, diseases are generally
classified as impairments, even though they are rarely permanent or static
conditions. Diseases that are not long-lasting, however, such as the flu and
the measles, do not count as impairments.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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non-disabled persons, and in some cases wider. There is such
a wide variety in function and experience among people with
disabilities that some scholars have called disability a
category “highly problematic” in terms of developing a
narrow or strict definition. 119
It is worth considering here why we might need to define
disability at all. There seem to be at least three purposes:
remedial, categorical, and social. 120
First, people with disabilities overwhelmingly face
discrimination, stigma, and bias. 121 If we want to be able to
end discrimination against people with disabilities, and if we
seek to remedy that harm, then we may need to have a strict
sense of what the term disability means. It may be necessary,
for example, to utilize some classification in order to
distinguish disability discrimination from other types of
discrimination—to point out the particularities of disability

119. Jonas-Sebastien Beaudry, Beyond (Models of) Disability?, 41 J. MED. &
PHIL. 210, 210 (2016).
120. These purposes could also be categorized differently, for example into
legal and extra-legal, social, or normative purposes. Some of the definitional
categories described here could also be categorized as either derived from
authority or self-derived. This might also encompass in-group or out-group
definitions. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
1383, 1403 (2012).
121. See, e.g., JAMES W. TRENT JR., INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND: A HISTORY OF
MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 193–94 (1994); Lutz Kaelber,
Eugenics/Sexual Sterilizations in North Carolina, UNIV. OF VT.,
https://www.uvm.edu/~lkaelber/eugenics/NC/NC.html (Oct. 30, 2014); NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS
WITH
DISABILITIES
AND
THEIR
CHILDREN
76–78
(2012),
http://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf;
David Batty, People with Mental Illness Face Widespread Discrimination,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 28., 2004, 6:40 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/society
/2004/apr/28/equality.mentalhealth; Claire Henderson, Sara Evans-Lacko &
Graham Thornicroft, Mental Illness Stigma, Help Seeking, and Public Health
Programs, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 777, 777 (2013); Sara Heath, Understanding
Stigma as a Mental Healthcare Barrier, PATIENTENGAGEMENTHIT,
https://patientengagementhit.com/news/understanding-stigma-as-a-mentalhealthcare-barrier (last visited Dec. 21, 2021); Patrick W. Corrigan & Amy C.
Watson, Understanding the Impact of Stigma on People with Mental Illness, 1
WORLD PSYCHIATRY 16, 16 (2002).
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discrimination. 122 Legally, we need that definitional (and
evidentiary) clarity in order for a lawsuit or American
Disabilities Act (ADA) claim to be successful. And in society,
we might at least need self-defined parameters to help guide
remedies like anti-bias training or integration initiatives.
Second, definitions in this context serve as a proxy for
eligibility. Disability benefit programs, for example,
frequently provide broad categories of eligible disabilities,
along with lists of “eligible conditions.” This can encompass
eligibility for benefit programs, such as Social Security or
veterans benefits, as well as workers’ compensation. It can
also mean eligibility for certain social services, such as
programs to assist people with intellectual disabilities. 123
For children, this is an especially important definition, since
a particular diagnosis can lead to protections under the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA),
including access to an Individualized Education Plan (IEP)
requiring certain in-school services, accommodations, and
entitlement to special school programs and initiatives. So,
the list of “eligible” disabilities that qualify for SSA or IDEA
can be crucial for an individual seeking monetary or other
support.
Finally, the ability to self-define as disabled, if one
chooses, can be beneficial in terms of community support and
resources. It can aid in self-identify formation. And a
“coherent disability identity” can help an individual adapt to
disability. 124
I want to distinguish the complexity of the definition of
disability from the separate, but also critically important,
questions of individual medical diagnosis and proof. On the
122. See generally JEROME E. BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL DISABILITY
POLICY (1993).

AND

SOCIAL

123. See, e.g., Eligibility: Determine your Eligibility for Services, N.Y. STATE
OFF.
FOR
PEOPLE
WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES
(OPWDD),
https://opwdd.ny.gov/eligibility (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
124. Dana S. Dunn & Shane Burcaw, Disability Identity: Exploring Narrative
Accounts of Disability, 58 REHAB. PSYCH. 148, 155 (2013).
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broad definitional front, initially, there is the question of
whether a particular trait falls into the disability category. If
there is a list, a determination is made whether a particular
disability is included on that list or not. Next, there is the
question of the medical community’s acceptance of a
particular disability as a medical condition or impairment:
the diagnosis. 125 Finally, there is the problem that some
disabilities, even when listed, and even when recognized by
doctors, still are then subject to evidence and proof problems
due to the subjective nature of the expression of that
disability. This results in a category of disabilities that are
compatible with a diagnosis but have a proof problem due to
their subjective nature. Disabilities in this category may or
may not be “on the list” or included in legal categorizations.
Omissions may be due to that very subjectivity or other
reasons.
As an example of the subjective disability category, the
veterans disability benefit compensation program will
ostensibly compensate a veteran with a service-connected
diagnosis of PTSD. It is “on the list,” so to speak, in that it is
a mental disorder, which is listed in the benefit
regulations. 126 PTSD is broadly recognized in psychiatry,
and it is certainly possible for an individual to obtain a
diagnosis. 127 However, many veterans still report that they
receive skepticism as claimants when attempting to utilize
the veterans disability benefit program—essentially,
evaluators accuse them of lying, exaggerating, or making it
up. 128 The relationship between subjectivity and evidence is
discussed in greater depth below.
The American historical definition of disability begins at
125. See, e.g., Fatma Inanici & Muhammad B. Yunus, History of Fibromyalgia:
Past to Present, 8 CURRENT PAIN HEADACHE REPS. 369, 373 (2004).
126. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 (2021).
127. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
MENTAL DISORDERS, 271–78 (5th ed. 2013).

AND

STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF

128. Janelle M. Langan, PTSD in Military Service Members, 19 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L., no. 1, at 1, 15–22 (2017).
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least in the 1930s, when the League of the Physically
Handicapped opposed discrimination in government and
employment. 129 This was the era of the 1935 Social Security
Act, providing income and vocational rehabilitation for
people with disabilities. 130 Even at that early stage of a
nascent disability rights movement, the League “perceived
themselves as a minority unprotected by the law rather than
‘medical models’ victimized by physical impairments.” 131
As to current definitions, institutions have been, and
remain, inconsistent. Consider, for example, the following
current definitions:
The Americans with Disabilities Act:
“A person who has a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, a person
who has a history or record of such an impairment, or a
person who is perceived by others as having such an
impairment.” 132
The Social Security Administration:
“A person who is not able to engage in any substantial
gainful activity (SGA) because of a medically-determinable
physical or mental impairment(s): That is expected to result
in death, or that has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least 12 months.” 133
The United Nations:
“Persons with disabilities include those who have longterm physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments
which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis
129. FLEISCHER & ZAMES, supra note 109, at 5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
133. Disability Evaluation Under Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/general-info.htm
(last
visited Dec. 21, 2021).
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with others.” 134
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention identifies
disabilities that affect a person’s “vision, movement,
thinking, remembering, learning, communicating, hearing,
mental health, and social relationships.” 135
The World Health
dimensions to disability:

Organization

identifies

three

1. Impairment in a person’s body structure or function, or mental
functioning; examples of impairments include loss of a limb, loss of
vision or memory loss. 2. Activity limitation, such as difficulty
seeing, hearing, walking, or problem solving. 3. Participation
restrictions in normal daily activities, such as working, engaging in
social and recreational activities, and obtaining health care and
preventive services. 136

In 1999, the Supreme Court attempted in Cleveland v.
Policy Management Systems Corp. to reconcile some of the
different definitions in the Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) provision of the Social Security Act (SSA)
with definitions contained in the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). 137 Justice Breyer identified different purposes for
the two statutes, indicating that the SSA provides monetary
benefits, while the ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted
discrimination. He went on to hold that the plaintiff could be
considered “totally disabled” for purposes of SSDI while also
able to “perform the essential functions” of her job when
reasonable accommodations were considered. 138
While this case allowed claimants to pursue both SSA
benefits and ADA claims, it nevertheless failed to take on the

134. G.A. Res. 61/106, annex I, Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, art. 1 (Jan. 24, 2007).
135. Disability and Health Overview, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/disability.html
(last
visited Dec. 21, 2021).
136. Id.
137. See 526 U.S. 795, 797 (1999).
138. Id. at 807.
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foundational issue of what it means to be disabled.
The field of critical disability studies frequently refers to
the evolution from the “medical model” to the “social model”
of disability. As Elizabeth Emens explains:
The traditional understanding of disability—the so-called medical
model—views disability as a medical problem requiring a medical
solution. By contrast, the social model says that someone is disabled
by the interaction between her body (or mind) and the disabling
environment that is built for one kind of body (or mind) rather than
another. . . .
Few disability scholars or activists embrace a pure social model.
Most recognize that not all disability is culturally constructed, but
that culture still creates much of the disability associated with what
we consider impairments. This middle-ground position recognizes
that there can be pain or difficulty associated with disability, and
that sometimes disability does require more resources or more
support than other states of being, but still emphasizes that much
of what makes disability disabling is the way the world is currently
constructed.
Despite the efforts by advocates and scholars to promote the
social model, the medical model arguably prevails in the broader
culture, as does the sense that a disability is a lack that requires
costly filling. It seems plausible that this understanding of
disability primes courts, commentators, and others to see the
accommodations made for disability as beneficial to those for whom
they are designed, and costly for others, particularly for those
others who are not disabled. 139

There are, on the one hand, definitions that continue to
utilize biological impairments as the main definitional
component of disability. In the other direction, there have
been definitions of the term “disability” that view any
limitations faced by people with disabilities solely through
the lens of “contemporary social organization”—that is, a
purely social model. In that view, the undesirable aspects of
an impairment, such as chronic pain, are not denied, but
neither are they a necessary part of the meaning of
disability. 140 Finally, there are many definitions that utilize
139. Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839,
882 (2008).
140. Wasserman et al., supra note 110.
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components from both, in that “individual impairment and
the social environment are jointly sufficient causes of
limitation.” 141
There is some imprecision in the literature here, because
some scholars investigate the “meaning of disability” along
the lines of which traits might “count” as a disability, while
others consider the word “disability” to refer only to the
social, and not diagnostic or medical, elements.
B. Subjectivity in Disability and Pain
As a preliminary, and perhaps overtly philosophical
matter, all experience is inherently subjective. 142 In this
Article, I am making a distinction between disabilities that
gain recognition by virtue of their objective verification and
those that cannot be so verified. This by no means, however,
indicates that an objectively verifiable disability has no
subjective component.
There is wide variation in the experience of disability,
just as there is wide variation within any definition of
disability. This is true in terms of the physical, sensory,
cognitive, or affective functions that differ by virtue of being
atypical in terms of body structure or function. This is also
true in terms of the social experience, including facing
stigma or discrimination on the basis of atypical body
structure or functioning.
There are a number of dimensions or categories of
disability, some of which have already been identified or
explained in this Article, especially as they relate to chronic

141. Id.
142. See, e.g., RENÉ DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 9 (John
Cottingham trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1641). For additional
discussion about the idea that experience is inherently subjective as it relates to
pain, see works on philosophy of the mind by Thomas Nagel, Daniel Dennett, and
others. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (Oxford Univ. Press
1986); BRYCE HUEBNER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF DANIEL DENNETT (Oxford Univ. Press
2016).
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pain. One “shadow” category that seems to overarch the
decision-making process relates to whether a disability can
be independently and objectively assessed.
Some disabilities simply cannot be denied. A CT scan can
show a spinal cord injury. 143 Diabetes can be diagnosed from
a blood glucose measurement. 144 Disabilities that can be
confirmed by testing, by and large, are favored both in terms
of their inclusion in classifications and in terms of being
easily provable. I will revisit the evidence issue below. For
now, the existence of disabilities that can be proven—
definitively, with lab tests—means that there is a potentially
favored class of objectively assessed disabilities.
On the other hand, there are impairments that require a
self-report of subjective experience in order to be medically
diagnosed. These impairments are less likely to be classified
as disabilities in the first place, and if they are classified, are
more likely to have evidence problems. 145 This includes
chronic pain that is not identifiable with testing and various
psychiatric disabilities. 146
143. Spinal Cord Injury: Diagnosis & Treatment, MAYO CLINIC, https://www
.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/spinal-cord-injury/diagnosis-treatment/drc20377895 (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) (testing for injury might include MRI, CT
Scan, and X-Ray).
144. Diabetes: Diagnosis & Treatment, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic
.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20371451 (last visited
Dec. 21, 2021) (testing for both type 1 and type 2 involves the glycated hemoglobin
or A1C test).
145. See generally ANDREW MALLESON, WHIPLASH AND OTHER USEFUL
ILLNESSES 362 (2003) (“What science cannot encompass, it discredits. Neither
medicine nor science has ever been comfortable with subjectivity, though for most
of us, such interiority provides meaning and significance to our lives.”).
146. Though not the main point of this Article, there is quite a significant
controversy on this point. The psychologist Gary Greenberg has written on the
subject of the problem of psychiatric diagnostic procedure and classification. In a
2013 interview with The Atlantic, Dr. Greenberg was asked about the DSM-5 and
the difference between a disease on the one hand, and a disorder, which is what
the DSM purports to classify. He responded:
The difference between disease and disorder is an attempt on the part of
psychiatry to evade the problem they’re presented with. Disease is a kind
of suffering that’s caused by a bio-chemical pathology. Something that can
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Various symptoms, including fatigue, dizziness, and
nausea, cannot be objectively tested. 147 Other relatively
uncontroversial diagnoses, such as migraine headaches and
epilepsy, lack diagnostic tests. 148 Then there are disabilities
like fibromyalgia. 149 People with fibromyalgia pain
syndrome have historically struggled for medical
recognition, though today it has been recognized by the
American Medical Association, the National Institute of
Health, and the World Health Organization. 150
Courts and legal systems struggle with this. Indeed, the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) has
issued an entire report on the subject titled Evaluating
Subjective Symptoms in Disability Claims. 151 In that report,
be discovered and targeted with magic bullets. But in many cases our
suffering can’t be diagnosed that way. Psychiatry was in a crisis in the
1970s over questions like “what is a mental illness?” and “what mental
illnesses exist?” One of the first things they did was try to finesse the
problem that no mental illness met that definition of a disease. They had
yet to identify what the pathogen was, what the disease process consisted
of, and how to cure it. So they created a category called “disorder.” It’s a
rhetorical device. It’s saying “it’s sort of like a disease,” but not calling it a
disease because all the other doctors will jump down their throats asking,
“where’s your blood test?” The reason there haven’t been any sensible
findings tying genetics or any kind of molecular biology to DSM categories
is not only that our instruments are crude, but also that the DSM categories
aren’t real. It’s like using a map of the moon to find your way around
Russia.
Hope Reese, The Real Problems with Psychiatry, ATLANTIC (May 2, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/05/the-real-problems-withpsychiatry/275371/.
147. See David L. Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts—A Primer in
Toxicology for Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 5, 21 (2003) (“Symptoms, and
especially those without clear underlying medical explanations, account for a
large percentage of clinical encounters.”).
148. See Kevin P. White, Fibromyalgia: The Answer Is Blowin’ in the Wind, 31
J. RHEUMATOLOGY 636, 637 (2004).
149. See Rayford R. June & Rohit Aggarwal, The Use and Abuse of
Diagnostic/Classification Criteria, 28 BEST PRAC. RSCH. CLINICAL
RHEUMATOLOGY 921, 925–26 (2014).
150. DANIEL J. WALLACE & JANICE BROCK WALLACE, ALL ABOUT FIBROMYALGIA,
at ix (2002).
151. See generally ADMIN. CONF.
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ACUS reminds evaluators that “subjective symptoms,”
including pain, are not within the statutory definition of
disability, and that any compensable impairment must be
“demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 152 I will revisit this below
during the discussion of evidence in Part IV.
Importantly, as to the objective or subjective question,
there is overlap but not exclusion from the visible and
invisible disability categories. Disability scholars, activists,
and advocates have identified that some disabilities are
“visible” and some “invisible,” though this line is not always
clear-cut and, indeed, visibility can be subjective and change
over time. 153 In broad categories, however, visible disabilities
are those which are immediately perceived or identified by
others, while invisible disabilities might require a proactive
disclosure or longer-term interaction in order to be “seen.” A
wheelchair user would have a visible disability, while
someone with bipolar disorder might have an invisible
disability. Visibility might be predicated on the observable
physical structure of someone’s body or because of the use of
an assistive device. 154 Some assistive devices are readily
“hideable” or not as visible, such as hearing aids, while some
are harder to miss.
Jasmine Harris has also argued compellingly that visible
disability markers profoundly affect interactions with and
perceptions of people with disabilities. 155 She has also noted
that this can be manipulated, as she charged that Harvey
Weinstein’s use of a walker during his trial “create[d]
SUBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS IN DISABILITY CLAIMS (2015), https://www.acus.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/SSA%20Symptom%20Evaluation_%20Final%20Report
_Revised.pdf.
152. Id. at 13.
153. Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and
Special Rights Discourse, 53 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1051, 1067 (2019).
154. See id.
155. Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 895,
931–50 (2019).
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impressions and . . . reinforce[d] prejudices.” 156
There is complexity here in that people with invisible
disabilities may be able to “pass” for non-disabled if they
choose, but on the other hand they may face more doubt as
to the existence of their disability than those with visible
disabilities. By contrast, people with visible disabilities
might face regular stigma or discrimination because they
cannot “hide” their disability. While it is possible that they
might also be more readily “believed” as to their disability,
on the other hand they might be tasked more often with
“proving” that it exists, especially by strangers in public. 157
The reason that these terms are not completely apt here
is that there are invisible disabilities—including those that
cannot be identified immediately upon viewing a person’s
body—that can be assessed via measures such as lab tests.
One such example is multiple sclerosis (MS), which is
typically diagnosed via blood testing, spinal tap, MRI, and
other tests. 158 However, depending on the person, the
progression, and the day, someone with MS may or may not
be “visibly” disabled. 159
Finally, on not understanding subjective experience, it
should be noted that people without disabilities seem
routinely unable to accurately predict or understand the
experience of disability. 160 Furthermore, subjective
156. Jasmine E. Harris, Opinion, The Truth About Harvey Weinstein’s Walker,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
30,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30
/opinion/harvey-weinstein-walker.html.
157. See id.
158. Multiple Sclerosis: Diagnosis & Treatment, MAYO CLINIC, https://www
.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/multiple-sclerosis/diagnosis-treatment/drc20350274 (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).
159. See, e.g., Jacqueline Andriakos, 6 People Explain What It’s Really Like to
Live With MS, HEALTH, https://www.health.com/condition/multiple-sclerosis
/multiple-sclerosis-real-people-stories-2016 (Jan. 22, 2016) (discussion by JaimeLynn Sigler on the “unpredictable” nature of her MS).
160. See, e.g., Peter A. Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The
Disability Paradox and Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57,
S57 (2005); Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide:
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disabilities do not necessarily “make sense” under the typical
model, where there is an objectively determined pathology
such as tissue damage or dysfunction. 161
C. Pain as Disability
According to data from the Centers for Disease Control,
“35.8 percent of all reported disabilities are due to painful
conditions (back, spine, arthritis, rheumatism).” 162 The
historic refusal to acknowledge pain as a disability can be
tied to a number of factors. 163 The medical community has
traditionally referred to the “underlying” condition, or
disability, and treated pain as a symptom. If, by contrast,
there is no underlying condition, or the previous underlying
condition has healed, then the standalone symptom of pain
would not be recognized in its own right.
An Examination of Empirical Evidence, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 526, 526 (2000);
Ian Basnett, Health Care Professionals and Their Attitudes toward Decisions
Affecting Disabled People, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 450, 451 (Gary L.
Albrecht et al. eds., 2001).
161. See Robert M. Bennett, Fibromyalgia and the Disability Dilemma, 39
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 1627, 1627 (1996). I would also like to acknowledge the
large body of scholarship on mental health parity in insurance plans, which
informs many discussions of disability definitions and theory. The Mental Health
Parity Act (MHPA) of 1994 and the Mental Health Parity And Addiction Equity
Act (MHPAEA) of 2008 were necessary to address the lack of requirement for
health insurers to cover any mental health or addiction treatment in their plans.
This history is a direct result of the disparate treatment of non-visible disabilities
in comparison to their visible counterparts. See, e.g., Samuel Bagenstos, The
Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 29 (2004); Mary Crossley,
Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. KAN. L. REV.
73, 105–07 (2005).
162. NAGEL, supra note 14, at 138.
163. See id. at 142–43, on pain as a disability, noting that
[i]n the past, it was assumed that pain was ubiquitous and similar from
person to person and merely an accompaniment of another disabling
condition such as a broken leg or a spinal cord injury. . . . Experts have only
recently come to appreciate the complexity of pain and to acknowledge that
all pain is not alike. This new understanding has profound implications for
the concept of pain as a disability in itself, an issue that is further
complicated by the way we have chosen to explain, measure, and
compensate disability.
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More recently, however, there has been movement in the
medical community on this issue. The National Academy of
Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine), a private,
nonprofit institution, provides advice on public health and
medicine in the public policy arena. 164 In 2011, a report from
the then-named Institute of Medicine (IOM) provided
findings and recommendations on pain that were influential
to the current understanding of pain in Relieving Pain in
America: A Blueprint for Transforming Prevention, Care,
Education, and Research (IOM Report). 165
The IOM Report produced a long list of findings and
recommendations, a few of which are particularly notable,
and therefore reproduced here:
• The public at large and people with pain would benefit from a
better understanding of pain and its treatment in order to
encourage timely care, improve medical management, and
combat stigmatization.
• Increased scientific knowledge regarding the pathophysiology of
pain has led to the conclusion that chronic pain can be a disease
in itself that requires adequate treatment and a research
commitment. . . .
• Significant barriers to pain care exist, especially for populations
disproportionately affected by and undertreated for pain and
need to be overcome.
• People with pain are too often stigmatized in the health care
system and in society, which can lead to delayed diagnosis or
misdiagnosis, bias in treatment, and decreased effectiveness of
care. 166

Following the IOM Report, the Interagency Pain
Research Coordinating Committee (IPRCC), a collaboration
between the National Institute of Health and the former
Institute of Medicine, was created and a report from that
164. About Us: Who We Are, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED.,
https://www.nationalacademies.org/about (last visited Dec. 21, 2021). Note that
because of the name change, the organization is still often referred to as IOM.
165. IOM REPORT, supra note 21.
166. Id. (internal citations omitted); IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note
27, at 3–4 (citations omitted).
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body was released in 2016. 167 This report, National Pain
Strategy: A Comprehensive Population Health-Level Strategy
for Pain, has helped produce a comprehensive practice of
pain management in the United States. 168
The IPRCC Pain Strategy Report used sweeping and
forceful language to declare that chronic pain is a disability.
The National Pain Strategy Strategic Vision included the
following language:
The Strategy envisions an environment in which: . . .
• All people with pain would be assured of receiving needed
preventive, assessment, treatment, and self-management
interventions, regardless of race, color, nationality, ethnicity,
religion, income, gender, sex, age (neonatal through end of life),
mental health and substance use disorders, physical or cognitive
disability, sexual orientation and gender identification,
geographic location, education, language proficiency, health
literacy, or medical condition. All pain-related services would be
provided without bias, discrimination, or stigmatization.
• Americans would recognize chronic pain as a complex disease
and a threat to public health and productivity. Individuals who
live with chronic pain would be viewed and treated with
compassion and respect. . . .
• A more robust and well trained behavioral health work force
would be available to support the needs of patients who suffer
from chronic pain, including those at risk who need mental
health care and substance abuse prevention and recovery
treatment. 169

If the IPRCC Pain Strategy Report is an indication of
acceptance in the medical community, then chronic pain has
made great strides. The key components discussed in Part I
of subjectivity, bias, stigma, disparate treatment, and impact
on mental health are being recognized in medicine. Law has,
so far, not followed suit.

167. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27.
168. See, e.g., Jacob Gross & Debra B. Gordon, The Strengths and Weakness of
Current US Policy to Address Pain, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 66, 66 (2018).
169. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 6–7 (citations omitted).

2021]

PAIN IS ENOUGH

1515

D. Social Security’s Failure to Recognize Pain as a
Disability
The Social Security Administration historically, and
explicitly, excludes chronic pain, absent a connection to an
underlying, medically determinable impairment, from the
definition of disability. At best, it is an exacerbating factor of
another disability; at worst, it is ignored entirely.
Each entitlement and benefit system in the United
States utilizes its own criteria to determine eligibility for
services, although many of them are interconnected, refer to
each other, and may use the same or similar references.
Some entitlement systems use the American Medical
Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment to determine whether someone is qualified to
receive services. 170 Many state workers’ compensation
systems and boards, federal systems, personal injury, and
tort cases use these Guides to “rate” the level of
impairment. 171 This allows comparison between people and
across disabilities—even if that comparison is ultimately
arbitrary, invalid, or inaccurate. 172
In state workers’ compensation schemes, for example, a
physician will provide a “rating” calculation for a permanent,
partial disability, based on a reference like the AMA
Guides. 173 However, treatment outcomes for chronic pain
resist classification in such a system, ultimately failing
chronic pain patients seeking compensation. 174
These programs typically “do not compensate for pain
independently; rather, they largely compensate lost-earning
170. AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT: AN OVERVIEW, https://www.ama-assn.org/print/pdf/node/41496 (last
visited Dec. 21, 2021).
171. NAGEL, supra note 14, at 143.
172. Id. at 143–44.
173. Id. at 144.
174. See id.
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capacity to some degree. Yet these programs process an
enormous number of claims in which the worker alleges that
the compensable loss-wage-earning capacity results in whole
or part from the pain he or she experiences.” 175 Deciding
which types and levels of pain will “count,” and determining
how to measure and compensate for that pain, remains a
significant issue. 176
In contrast to the above scheme, the SSA defines
“disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment.” 177 This definition applies to
both the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). 178 The Act goes on to
specify that the physical or mental impairment must
“result[] from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 179
Moreover, the SSA states that “[a]n individual’s
statement as to pain . . . shall not alone be conclusive
evidence of disability as defined in this section.” 180 Rather,
“there must be medical signs and findings, established by
medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques, which show the existence of a medical
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be
expected to produce the pain.” 181

175. Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and the Ineradicable Problems of Pain,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REV 239, 241 (1991).
176. See id. at 241–42.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
178. See, e.g., Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 n.3 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The
definition of ‘disability’ is the same for SSDI and SSI benefits.” (citing Perez v.
Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996))).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
181. Id.
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To meet the definition of disability, an applicant must
not be able to engage in any substantial gainful activity
(SGA) because of a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment that is “expected to result in death” or
“has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period
of at least 12 months.” 182
In the Social Security Medical Listings Book (the Blue
Book), chronic pain may qualify if there is physical or mental
impairment. 183 It is not considered a stand-alone condition,
disease, or disability. 184 The SSA relies on disability
definitions that are “medically determinable,” meaning in
this context, objectively verifiable with symptoms and lab or
other testing. 185 So-called “symptoms”—like pain—are not
sufficient, no matter their severity. 186 As has been explained
above, this is contrary to the current move in the medical
understanding of pain.
The SSA specifically identifies in the Code of Federal
Regulations that there must be a “medically determinable
impairment” causing claimed pain. 187

182. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
183. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DISABILITY EVALUATION UNDER SOCIAL
SECURITY pt. A, § 1.00 [hereinafter THE SSA BLUE BOOK], https://www.ssa.gov
/disability/professionals/bluebook/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) (under adult
listings for musculoskeletal disorder, discussing how to consider pain: “D. How
do we consider symptoms, including pain, under these listings? 1.
Musculoskeletal disorders may cause pain or other symptoms; however, your
statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you
are disabled. We will not substitute an alleged or a reported increase in the
intensity of a symptom, such as pain, no matter how severe, for a medical sign or
diagnostic finding present in the listing criteria. Pain is included as just one
consideration in 1.15A, 1.16A, and 1.18A, but it is not required to satisfy the
criteria in 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18.”).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b) (2021).
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From the SSA:
(b) Need for medically determinable impairment that could
reasonably be expected to produce your symptoms, such as
pain. Your symptoms, such as pain, fatigue, shortness of breath,
weakness, or nervousness, will not be found to affect your ability to
do basic work activities unless medical signs or laboratory findings
show that a medically determinable impairment(s) is present.
Medical signs and laboratory findings, established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, must show
the existence of a medical impairment(s) which results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities and which
could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged. 188

All other provisions within the SSA flow from the
presumption that there must be a medically determinable
impairment, including the potential catch-all category of
“residual functional capacity,” which might plausibly include
chronic pain. 189
Finally, even if the pain can be shown to link to an
underlying impairment, claimants must still show that the
underlying impairment “could reasonably be expected to
produce” the pain. 190 The reasonableness link itself must be
established by clinical or lab data and be part of a welldocumented medical history. 191
The varied definitions of disabilities used across benefits
programs and statutory schemes amount to a significant
hurdle to recognizing pain as a disability and ensuring that
people who are suffering pain receive the recognition and
benefits they deserve. In order to overcome these hurdles,
courts and legislators will have to change their view of
subjective evidence of disability.

188. Id.
189. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d)(4) (2021).
190. Social Security Ruling 16–3p Titles II And XVI: Evaluation Of Symptoms
In Disability Claims, 82 Fed. Reg. 49462 (Oct. 25, 2017).
191. See Pryor, supra note 175, at 263.
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III. PAIN IS ENOUGH: VETERANS DISABILITY BENEFITS
RECOGNIZE PAIN AS DISABILITY
Although the veterans disability benefits system
historically treated pain the same way the SSA did,
essentially ignoring it, a recent Federal Circuit case
determined that, by contrast, “pain is enough” for veterans
disability benefits.
A. The Veterans Benefits Service-Connected Disability
Compensation Program
The Veterans Benefits Service-Connected Disability
Compensation Program provides benefits to veterans who
have a service-connected disability. The closest analogue to
the current veterans benefits system began when Congress
first adopted “a schedule for rating veteran service-connected
disability on a percentage basis with a methodology similar
to the current system.” 192 This was the War Risk Insurance
Act of 1914, and the important feature of this Act was a
disability rating schedule. The schedule was specifically
designed to rate the reduction in earning capacity—how
much less a person might earn due to disability experienced
as a result of military service. The other important feature is
that it is based on average reduction in earning, rather than
an actual reduction specific to the individual. 193 This could
help or hurt an individual. For example, someone who earns
above the “average” for their disability would still earn the
same benefit as someone who earns below the average. Major
revisions to that schedule made in 1945 form the basis of the
modern schedule. 194
The focus on reduction in earning capacity makes this
definition of disability distinct from some other legal
192. Jennifer D. Oliva, Son of Sam, Service-Connected Entitlements, and
Disabled Veteran Prisoners, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 302, 310 (2018).
193. Id. at 310–11.
194. See id.
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definitions, as examined below. When the system was
created and the definitions put in place, there was no modern
understanding of disability at all. This would prove to be a
problem for individual claimants.
B. The Law of Service-Connected Disability Compensation
Within the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Veterans
Benefits Administration (VBA) administers the serviceconnected disability benefits program, which is the subject of
this Part. Service-connected disability compensation is
awarded to a claimant who proves
that he or she has completed satisfactory military service, that he
or she incurred an injury or disease while in the service, and that
he or she currently experiences symptoms of the injury or disease.
In addition, the courts also mandate that the claimant establish by
expert medical evidence that the service-connected injury or disease
is related to the current symptoms suffered by the veteran. 195

There are five elements of a claim, which include two
salient elements: the existence of a current disability (at the
time of the claim), as defined by the statute and regulations,
and a “connection” between the veteran’s service and the
disability. 196
The statutory backdrop of this area of law is found in
Title 38 of the U.S. Code, Veterans Benefits, specifically in
section 1110, the purpose of which is to provide compensation
to veterans for the impairment to their earning capacity
resulting from disability. This statute explains that wartime
veterans are entitled to disability compensation. 197

195. 121 AM. JUR. Trials 357 § 7 (2021) (internal citation omitted). Put another
way, a veteran seeking compensation under this provision must establish three
elements: “(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or
aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the
present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during
service.” Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
196. 12 AM. JUR. Trials 357 § 31 (2021).
197. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110.
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The statute does not define disability. It does, however,
provide a schedule for rating disabilities, which is the
Veterans Affairs (VA) Schedule for Rating Disabilities
(VASRD). There are myriad criticisms with the VASRD. 198
Of notable relevance to this discussion, one criticism is that
the rating schedule’s medical criteria often are obsolete or have
inadequately integrated current and accepted diagnostic
procedures. The current VASRD, therefore, fails to reflect the
realities of the modern U.S. economy, which demands a
predominantly knowledge- and service-based labor market. It also
has failed to keep up with the myriad advances in medicine over the
ensuing seven-plus decades since the conclusion of the Second
World War. 199

The rating schedules for physical disability are
extremely specific. For example, under the broad category
“musculoskeletal system” there are 296 disabilities listed
and over 40 rating schedules. 200 This means that, for
example, rheumatoid arthritis has a different rating
schedule than impairment of the scapula. Each schedule is
specific to a physical disability; there are multiple schedules
for amputation of a finger, for example, specific to the
particular finger at issue and where on that finger the
amputation was done. 201
198. The Rand Corporation, among others, lists criticisms of the VASRD in the
following categories: it is out of date; it can shortchange individuals; it blends
quality of life with earning reduction; and it crowds out retirement compensation.
Richard Buddin & Bing Han, Is Military Disability Compensation Adequate to
Offset Civilian Earnings Losses from Service-Connected Disabilities?, 2 RAND
HEALTH Q., no. 3, Fall 2012, https://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/healthquarterly/issues/v2/n3/09.html.
199. Oliva, supra note 192, at 315 (citations omitted).
200. 38 C.F.R. § 4.40–105 (2020). The broad categories listed are: the
Musculoskeletal System; the Organs of Special Sense; Impairment of Auditory
Acuity; Infectious Diseases, Immune Disorders and Nutritional Deficiencies; the
Respiratory System; the Cardiovascular System; the Digestive System; the
Genitourinary System; Gynecological Conditions and Disorders of the Breast; the
Hematologic and Lymphatic Systems; the Skin; the Endocrine System;
Neurological Conditions and Convulsive Disorders; Mental Disorders; and Dental
and Oral Conditions.
201. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 4.71a.
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C. The Law of Pain in Veterans Courts
The Federal Circuit has twice before come close to truly
wrestling with a case like that of Melba Saunders, once in
2001, and again in 2014. 202 However, long before that, the
Veterans Court had dispensed with pain-related claims with
regularity.
The law of pain in the Veterans Court mirrors the history
of pain in medicine and in other benefit systems—for the
most part, it was discounted and ignored. The cases fall
largely into two broad categories: cases where pain “alone”
was alleged, and therefore, compensation was denied; and
cases where the court found additional grounds for
compensation.
One unique aspect of veterans and administrative law
must be noted here. First, until a veteran’s case reaches a
federal appellate court, the administrative process is nonadversarial with the agency. 203 Then, upon a veteran
appealing a decision (a denial of benefits, for example), the
veteran has two opportunities for federal appellate review. 204
First, at the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC)
and, second, at the Federal Circuit. 205 Finally, the Federal
Circuit will only review issues of law on appeal. 206 It will
frequently resist interpretations of fact, and the review is not
de novo, which differentiates it from other benefits and
administrative appeals.

202. See Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi, 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Joyner
v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
203. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, HOW DO I
APPEAL? 2 (2015), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Pamphlets/How-Do-I-AppealBooklet--508Compliance.pdf.
204. See Court Process, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS,
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/court_process.php (last visited Dec. 27, 2021).
205. Id.
206. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1), (2); see, e.g., Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d
976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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1. When Pain Was Not Enough
The first group of cases involve claimants with varying
degrees of disability who could not show an underlying
pathology sufficient enough to satisfy the court.
Tyra K. Mitchell, a veteran of the U.S. Navy and the U.S.
Air Force Reserves, is a typical example. 207 During training
one day, Ms. Mitchell experienced a torn ACL and a torn
anterior aspect of the lateral meniscus in her left knee. She
collapsed in pain and subsequently underwent surgery to
repair the tears. 208
Even after surgery, Ms. Mitchell continued to experience
a great deal of pain in her knee. She reported intense pain
when standing, when walking, and during certain
movements. This pain was a hindrance to her job as a
security guard and was also limiting her movement in her
daily life. Her range of motion was impaired, with limited
flexion in her knee. 209
Ms. Mitchell at first received a full denial at the VA
Regional Office level, and then eventually received a 10
percent disability rating based solely on the range of motion
impairment. She appealed for a Board review and received
the same result. The other functional impacts—her intense
pain, her weakened movements, excess fatigability,
diminished endurance, and incoordination—did not warrant
any increase in her rating.
Ms. Mitchell argued that moving her knee was
possible—but painful. Citing a line of cases concerning
arthritis, she argued that moving her knee was so painful
that her movement was effectively limited. 210 The Secretary,
207. See Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 32 (2011); see also Thompson v.
McDonald, 815 F.3d 781 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
208. Mitchell, 25 Vet. App. at 33.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 33–34. The two cases cited contained statements regarding the
relationship between painful movement and limited movement. See id. at 34 (first
citing Lichtenfels v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 484 (1991); and then citing Hicks v.
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by contrast, argued that painful motion is not a functional
loss—if you can move, you can move, no matter how painful
it is; and, therefore, you cannot be compensated.
The CAVC held that “pain itself does not rise to the level
of functional loss.” 211 In so holding, the Court essentially
denied that chronic pain was a disability—its manifestation
and effects did not matter to the question of compensation.
How did it happen that Ms. Mitchell experienced that
degree of pain during her regular movement, and yet faced a
Board that refused to compensate her? The answer comes in
part from the much-cited Federal Circuit case SanchezBenitez v. Principi (Sanchez-Benitez II). 212 Courts also refer
to the lower level, Veterans Court Sanchez-Benitez decision
(Sanchez-Benitez I). 213
Jose A. Sanchez-Benitez, a 15-year Army veteran,
sought compensation related to neck and lower back pain. 214
During his service, he started complaining of back pain while
lifting heavy equipment. 215 He testified that after his
discharge, he experienced “constant” pain in his back, which
radiated down his back and caused sleeplessness, as well as
preventing him from engaging in recreation. 216 His neck pain
caused “popping” and also radiated down his back. 217 He
received diagnoses of “lumbar muscle spasm” and “history of
trauma to the cervical area with residual pain.” 218
Nevertheless, the VA examiner was unable to find “a definite

Brown, 8 Vet. App. 417 (1995)).
211. Id. at 38.
212. Sanchez-Benitez v. Principi (Sanchez-Benitez II), 259 F.3d 1356 (Fed Cir.
2001).
213. Sanchez-Benitez v. West (Sanchez-Benitez I), 13 Vet. App. 282 (1999).
214. Id. at 283.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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or specific cause” for the pain. 219
The Veterans Court in Sanchez-Benitez I was clear. The
court declared an oft cited holding that “pain alone, without
a diagnosed or identifiable underlying malady or condition,
does not in and of itself constitute a disability for which
service connection may be granted.” 220
The Court further clarified that pain could only be
considered as it related to other claims. Pain was, in essence,
a symptom that could change the rating of a disability but
was not a disability itself. For example, pain could be
considered alongside functional loss of musculoskeletal
system, a joint disability causing pain on movement, or pain
associated with a muscle disability. 221 But “pain alone” was
not enough.
In Sanchez-Benitez II, the Federal Circuit further
confirmed that pain is relevant in determinations of
disability. However, the Court declined to decide the
ultimate issue of “pain alone,” calling the question of whether
pain alone is a compensable disability an “interesting” and
“perplexing” question. 222
The Court determined that a nexus must still exist, even
if “pain alone was sufficient,” between the current disability
and an in-service disease or injury. Because Mr. SanchezBenitez could not show an in-service injury sufficiently tied
to his claimed current disability, the Court did not have to
determine if his pain was “enough.” 223
A divided Federal Circuit panel thus affirmed the denial
of service connection based on the factual finding of a lack of
nexus, without addressing the “interesting, indeed
perplexing, question” of whether pain alone is a compensable
219. Id. at 282–84.
220. Id. at 285.
221. See id.
222. See Sanchez-Benitez II, 259 F.3d at 1361.
223. Id. at 1361–62.
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disability. 224 That failure to address the question led to the
subsequent denial of pain-related claims in nearly every
case. Before Saunders, discussed in Section III.D, the rule
that pain alone is not a compensable disability was enforced
nearly one hundred times since its original pronouncement
in Sanchez-Benitez II. 225
Then in 2014, in Joyner v. McDonald, the Federal Circuit
declined to address the interpretation of § 1110 discussed
above, finding instead that the veteran had not properly
raised the issue before the Veterans Court, and resolving the
case instead on a related but distinct question of the
interpretation of § 1117. 226
Tarell Joyner, a Marine who served one tour of duty in
the Persian Gulf, was twice treated in service for neck pain.
The question before the court was whether his neck pain
could evidence a chronic disability when it was a symptom of
an “undiagnosed illness.” 227 Ultimately, the court confirmed
that pain could evidence a disability; however, the court was
still determined to rely on the idea of an underlying
diagnosis. 228 Even if undiagnosed, the statutory
requirements for “undiagnosed illness” still presume that
there is, in fact, an underlying illness that could be
diagnosed, but that simply has not been.

224. Id.
225. Saunders v. McDonald, No. 15–0975, 2016 WL 3002862, at *4 (Vet. App.
May 25, 2016) (“The Court has handled Sanchez-Benitez more than 100 times
since its issuance. The Court either itself relied upon or affirmed the Board’s
application of Sanchez-Benitez at least 83 times. It cited without comment or
noted without question the Board’s application of the case on at least 15 other
occasions. It noted the Board’s application of the case and either disagreed with
how the Board applied it or decided the appeal on other grounds on at least 12
occasions.” (citations omitted)), rev’d sub nom. Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
226. See Joyner v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1393, 1395–96 & n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
227. See id. at 1394–95.
228. See id. at 1395.
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2. Pain as a Symptom of a Different Disability
Of course, the Veterans Court did find ways to
compensate some pain, but only where there was an
additional “something” to hang their hat on.
In Allen v. Brown, for example, Alfred E. Allen sought
compensation for knee and hip pain. The court held that, “as
used in § 1110,” disability “refers to impairment of earning
capacity, and that such definition mandates that any
additional impairment of earning capacity resulting from an
already service-connected condition, regardless of whether or
not the additional impairment is itself a separate disease or
injury caused by the service-connected condition, shall be
compensated.” 229
This case stands for the proposition that service
connection may be granted as long as the disability can be
traced to service, even if the specific onset of the disability
cannot be pinpointed.
D. Melba Saunders and Pain as Impairment
Melba Saunders served on active duty in the Army for
almost seven years. During her service, she sought
treatment for knee pain and was diagnosed with
patellofemoral pain syndrome (PFPS). 230 Upon exiting the
Army, her exam noted a history of swollen knee and hip
joints and bone spurs on her feet.
As part of her subsequent disability benefit claim, Ms.
Saunders underwent a medical examination at the VA.
While her functional limitations were noted during the exam,
she was not observed to have any “anatomic abnormality,
weakness, or reduced range of motion.” 231
After initially diagnosing Ms. Saunders with “bilateral

229. Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995).
230. See Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
231. Id.
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knee pain,” the VA examiner in a subsequent report
acknowledged that there was “no pathology” to render a
diagnosis, other than her pain. 232 Essentially, according to
her medical exam, she did indeed have pain—but that was
all she had. The lower court determined that “pain alone”
was not a disability and therefore denied her claim.
After the initial denial, Ms. Saunders appealed to the VA
Board, the last stage of administrative exhaustion before the
Federal Circuit review process. In presenting her case to the
Board, Ms. Saunders argued that she had a diagnosis in
service, and now she had pain; she had a VA examiner
willing to link the two, establishing service connection.
What she did not have, according to the Board, was a
present disability. 233 Relying on Sanchez-Benitez I, the
Board, and later the Veterans Court, found that pain alone
was not a disability. 234 Without a current underlying
pathology, the Board and Veterans Court would not find
service connection.
When the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals took the
Saunders appeal, it finally addressed head-on what it had
punted in Sanchez-Benitez II: whether pain alone could be
the basis of a current disability. The court held that it could,
and in the case of Ms. Saunders, that it was the basis of a
current disability. The Federal Circuit
reversed and
remanded, finding that the lower court “erred as a matter of
law in finding that Saunders’ pain alone, absent a specific
diagnosis or otherwise identified disease or injury, cannot
constitute a disability under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2016).” 235 The
innovation in Saunders was to treat pain as a “functional
impairment” and therefore a disability in and of itself. 236

232. Id.
233. See id. at 1358–59.
234. See id. at 1359.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 1368.
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This is exactly the argument that Tyra K. Mitchell made, and
lost, just a few years before. 237
Crucial to the court’s ability here to find for Saunders
was that the lower court did not make findings that took the
case outside of its jurisdiction for appeal. The lower court did
not find that the pain was unrelated to an injury or disease,
for example. 238 In fact, the lower court acknowledged that
there was a diagnosis while she was in service. It was the
component of “present disability” that was the problem.
1. Disability as a Functional Impairment
The central issue of Saunders is whether pain alone
constitutes a § 1110 disability. The Saunders court defined
disability as a functional impairment, rather than the
underlying cause of the impairment. 239 This is a critical
distinction because the court could have defined disability as
synonymous with injury or disease. For example, the court
notes that Congress has done just that in another section of
the statute:
When Congress has decided to depart from this distinction by
defining “disability” as equivalent to an injury or disease, it has
done so explicitly, according to Saunders. For example, in chapter
17 of Title 38, referring to VA medical and nursing facilities,
Congress stated that “[t]he term ‘disability’ means a disease, injury,
or other physical or mental defect.” 240

But the Saunders court asserted that Congress has made
no such explicit statement as to the meaning of “disability”
in § 1110. Furthermore, “the statutory purpose to
compensate veterans based upon degree of impairment of
earning capacity” led to a different meaning of the term in
§ 1110—namely, that it “refers to impairment of earning

237. Mitchell v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 32, 32–33 (2011).
238. Saunders, 886 F.3d at 1360.
239. Id. at 1362.
240. Id. at 1363 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1701(1)).
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capacity.” 241
Applying that definition, the court held that “any
additional impairment of earning capacity resulting from an
already service-connected condition, regardless of whether or
not the additional impairment is itself a separate disease or
injury caused by the service-connected condition, shall be
compensated.” 242
Finally, the court found “that ‘disability’ in § 1110 refers
to the functional impairment of earning capacity, not the
underlying cause of said disability.” 243
2. The Meaning of Functional Impairment
The meaning of “functional impairment of earning
capacity,” according to the Federal Circuit, is connected to
the ability of the body to function. The court held that pain
alone can functionally impair earning capacity because it
“diminishes the body’s ability to function, and that pain need
not be diagnosed as connected to a current underlying
condition to function as an impairment.” 244
The Saunders court further elaborated that:
Dictionary definitions for the term “impairment” support the
Court’s conclusion that pain can serve as a functional impairment.
Dorland’s Medical Dictionary defines “impairment” as “any
abnormality of, partial or complete loss of, or loss of the function of,
a body part, organ, or system,” and this dictionary uses pain as a
specific example of an impairment. Webster’s defines “impair” as
“diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength.” Merriam–
Webster’s defines “impaired” as disabled or functionally defective.
“None of these definitions preclude finding that pain may
functionally impair a veteran.” 245

241. Id.
242. Id. (quoting Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1364.
245. Id. (first quoting Impairment, DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (32d ed. 2012); then Impair, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1961); and then Impaired, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
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The court also discussed situations where pain alone
may not be enough—in the Social Security Act, for example,
there is a different definition. 246 The court noted that the
regulations on disability ratings themselves treat “pain” as a
form of “functional impairment.” For example, 38 C.F.R.
§ 4.10 reads that “[t]he basis of disability evaluations is the
ability of the body as a whole, or of the psyche, or of a system
or organ of the body to function under the ordinary conditions
of daily life including employment.” The “functional loss”
regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 4.40, “makes clear that functional loss
may be due to pain and that pain may render a part seriously
disabled.” 247 Functional loss is compensable even if the range
of motion is not limited. 248
Finally, the court noted that subjective pain alone is not
sufficient to establish disability. A veteran’s pain must
amount to a functional impairment. The Veteran would have
to show that their pain “reaches the level of a functional
impairment of earning capacity. The policy underlying
veterans compensation—to compensate veterans whose
ability to earn a living is impaired as a result of their military
service—supports the holding we reach today.” 249
Therefore, while the Saunders decision indeed stretched
the bounds of disability in a meaningful way, it did not go far
enough. As discussed above, chronic pain is a disability, even
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014)).
246. Id. at 1365; see supra Section II.D (discussing some of the differences for
SSI purposes).
247. Thompson v. McDonald, 815 F.3d 781, 785–86 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Saunders,
886 F.3d at 1364.
248. Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 591–92 (1991) (noting that 38
C.F.R. § 4.40 contemplates multiple types of functional loss, and that functional
loss is compensable regardless of whether it is caused by pain or by limited
flexion); Petitti v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 415, 422, 424–30 (2015) (rejecting
Secretary’s argument that 38 C.F.R. § 4.59, which governs the evaluation of
painful motion, requires evidence observed during range-of-motion testing, and
rejecting the Secretary’s argument that “the mere presence of joint pain is not
sufficient”); Saunders, 886 F.3d at 1367.
249. Saunders, 886 F.3d at 1367–68.
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when fully subjective, and should not be disfavored by the
courts for that reason alone. It is not the fault of the
individual with chronic pain that their particular disability
is one which is less objectively verifiable, though this does
create a problem for courts to grapple with.
E. Pain Post-Saunders
In the wake of this decision, there have been as of this
writing 250 214 cases in the Veterans Court citing Saunders,
180 of which mention “pain” in some capacity.
The Veterans Court seems to be frequently remanding
cases to comply with the decision. For example, in Delmastro
v. Wilkie, the Veterans Court chastised the Board for its
failure to explain a denial of benefits for Army Veteran
Dominick Delmastro, who sought compensation for ankle
and foot pain. The court stated that, based on the denial and
lack of explanation, it was “concerned that the Board did not
fully understand the Federal Circuit’s decision.” 251
By contrast, the Veterans Court has asserted that, even
when there is pain that might establish a disability,
functional impairment of earning capacity is still a required
element. 252
F. Is Veterans Law Too Special?
In order to flesh out a fully formed idea of pain as
disability, perhaps Veterans Law is not the perfect starting
place. It is, after all, a special system.
There are multiple aspects of Veterans Benefits that
make it different from other compensation and disability
programs in the United States. To highlight just a few, the
250. As of November 2021.
251. Delmastro v. Wilkie, No. 18-4286, 2019 WL 5779758, at *1 (Vet. App. Nov.
6, 2019).
252. Cates v. Wilkie, No. 18-4616, 2019 WL 7041521, at *5 (Vet. App. Dec. 23,
2019).
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VA has a duty to assist Veterans with their claims up to the
appeals process, in a non-adversarial system, highly distinct
from other benefits and entitlement systems. Furthermore,
the Veterans Benefits system is available to any and all who
qualify, regardless of income or need, which distinguishes it
from
need-based
systems.
And
unlike
Workers’
Compensation schemes, an injury leading to disability
qualifies for benefits even if the Veteran was on leave.
Despite these unique aspects of Veterans Law, the
reasoning in Saunders can be a guide for practitioners,
advocates, and others to advance the notion that pain is a
disability. The nuances of Veterans Law were not the basis
of the legal reasoning in Saunders. The qualification or not
of a condition, symptom, or other characteristic need not be
tied to the peculiarities of the benefits system. If chronic pain
meets the definition for disability by all commonly accepted
standards, then it should be considered a disability for all
disability-related programs and services.
IV. IS SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE ENOUGH?
A. The Legal Problem of Subjectivity
As described above, there are disabilities whose
presentation is largely, or entirely, subjective. This can mean
not only that diagnosis (where necessary) relies primarily on
self-reports, rather than lab and testing, but also that the
courts rely on testimony and credibility determinations,
rather than direct medical evidence, to assess the nature and
severity of those disabilities.
This means, in practice, that some disabilities are
favored over others. It is widely believed that disability
benefit programs are much easier to access for people with
physical disabilities rather than on mental health
grounds. 253 This is the case even though psychiatry has
253. See, e.g., Social Security Disability Insurance And Supplemental Security
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similar levels of objectivity, as measured by observation
dependence and reliability as compared to other medical
disciplines. 254 Or to take another example, the law of
negligence “imposes a bifurcated rule for adult tortfeasors,
according to which physical disabilities of adults are
considered in determining liability, but mental disabilities
are ignored.” 255 In cases where objective medical evidence is
not possible, because no lab test exists for that particular
disability, claimants are frequently out of luck.
As to why subjective disabilities might be disfavored
generally and in the law, one answer seems to be a fear of
fakers. 256 The pervasive sense that people might be faking a
disability in order to get compensation has a long history. 257
The literature attempting to address this problem has,
so far, focused mainly on how to make subjectivity more
objective. To that end, scholars have suggested moving the
courts toward acceptance of new medical technologies for
brain imaging, pain detection, and other neuroscientific
advances. 258
Income: NAMI Public Policy Position, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
https://www.nami.org/NAMI/media/NAMI-Media/Public%20Policy/SSISSDI_final.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2021).
254. Ronald Pies, How “Objective” are Psychiatric Diagnoses? (Guess Again),
PSYCHIATRY (EDGMONT), Oct. 2007, at 18, 22; cf. supra text accompanying note
142.
255. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Mental Disabilities and Duty in Negligence Law:
Will Neuroscience Reform Tort Doctrine?, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 591, 595 (2015).
256. Dorfman, supra note 153, at 1055. Dorfman also notes that “[s]ocial
psychologists claim that uncertainty and lack of evidence regarding a person’s
eligibility or belonging to a certain group cause distrust. Therefore, it is fair to
assume that the less visible the disability, the more likely it is suspected as fake.
It is unsurprising that, of the narratives about situations in which respondents
felt suspected of faking disability, 42 percent (43 out of 102) mentioned having
‘nonapparent’ disabilities or ‘not looking sick/disabled.’ Nevertheless, people with
visible disabilities are also subject to the social expectation of proving their
disability to others.” Id. at 1067–68 (citations omitted).
257. Id. at 1055–60; see also Paul Harpur et al., Symposium, Regulating ‘Fake’
Assistance Animals—A Comparative Review of Disability Law in Australia and
the United States, 24 ANIMAL L. 77 (2018).
258. See, e.g., Pustilnik, supra note 43, at 1121–56; Henry T. Greely,
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This response does not fully address the problem, which
is that there are disabilities that can never be measured by a
blood test or MRI. As long as the focus is on prioritizing
medical evidence over subjective experience, those
disabilities will always be disfavored.
B. Subjectivity in Action: PTSD in Veterans’ Cases
An example of a continuing problem that may not be
solved by a Saunders analysis is that posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) in particular, and “mental disorders” in
general,
are
under-diagnosed,
misdiagnosed,
and
downplayed in the veterans disability benefit context, due to
a variety of factors.
This means that disability claims on the basis of mental
disorders are regularly denied. Veterans who do not receive
an initial appropriate diagnosis from a Veterans
Administration doctor may never pursue an appeal or benefit
claim at all. Next, if they do pursue a claim, they are not
likely to receive appropriate compensation if their condition
is minimized or misdiagnosed due to these same factors.
Finally, on appeal, the court will look at their diagnoses and
compare it to the rating schedule. This may result in the
court not being able to appropriately remedy the issue
because the schedule does not map to the diagnoses, or
because the particular symptoms of the individual do not
correspond.
A veteran must exhibit current symptomatology, or have
“a current medical diagnosis,” of PTSD, for example. 259
However, this is problematic for a few reasons. First,
diagnosis must come from a military psychiatrist. “A
Neuroscience, Mindreading, and the Courts: The Example of Pain, 18 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 171, 173 (2015); Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy
of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 434 (2007); Hilary Rosenthal,
Note, Scanning for Justice: Using Neuroscience to Create a More Inclusive Legal
System, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 290, 297, 300–04 (2019).
259. Golz v. Shinseki, 590 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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psychological diagnosis is supposed to be based on C & P
exam results and on a clinician’s observances during a
psychiatric interview. However, the psychiatric interviews
are optional, and the veteran generally is not allowed to
present the medical opinion of his or her own private
psychiatrist.”260
Next, misdiagnosis is common.
Even if symptoms of PTSD are detected, they may be
misattributed as symptoms of other disorders. . . . In addition, the
guidelines for physicians conducting PTSD examinations are
completely void of references to physical symptoms of PTSD, even
though research indicates that individuals who suffer from PTSD
frequently exhibit symptoms such as limb pain, back pain,
headaches, and indigestion. 261

Diagnoses of any mental disorder or disability must
conform to the DSM-5 criteria, per the Code of Federal
Regulations. For PTSD, for example, there must be a finding
by medical exam and report, 262 and the exam must be “based
upon consideration of the veteran’s prior medical history as
well as previous and current examinations.” 263 However,
there is a potential bias or conflict of interest for military
psychiatrists who seek to minimize costs to maximize
capacity for troops. 264 Veterans may have a fear of disclosing
actions taken while in service or after. This could well
include triggering trauma events or behavior resulting from
the condition. This will be on top of the fear that many
psychiatric patients have of disclosing mental health issues
even without these compounding factors. “[S]ervice members
must sign a vague waiver that explains that conversations
260. Alexandra S. Haar, Sweet Dreams Aren’t Made of These: How the VA’s
Disability Compensation Program Leaves Veterans Alone in the Nightmare of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 977–78 (2011).
261. Id. at 981.
262. 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a) (2021).
263. Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 301 (2008); Langan, supra
note 128, at 6.
264. Langan, supra note 128, at 5.
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with their therapist might not be kept confidential if they
admit to violating military laws. . . . This fear of prosecution
may prevent service members from opening up in discussions
with their doctors.” 265 Furthermore, there is a great deal of
pressure to under-diagnose serious mental health
conditions. 266
As described above, proving a service connection is
sometimes difficult. This problem is exacerbated for PTSD
and other mental health diagnoses. First, there must be an
in-service stressor, and different standards exist for veterans
in a combat versus a non-combat role. 267 Non-combat
veterans have a higher evidentiary burden placed on them to
provide evidence of an in-service stressor. 268
This higher burden is even more difficult when there are
incomplete, lost, or destroyed records. There must be
adequate records of the stressor event, and if not, the
veteran’s testimony alone is not sufficient. There was a 2010
amendment that expanded the definition of “stressor,” but
the proof problem remains. 269
1. How “Functional Impairment” Could Be Used in
“Mental Disorder” Cases
The functional impairment of earning capacity is what
the Saunders court says makes a disability. It is what makes
“pain alone” enough to qualify as a disability, even without a
current diagnosable condition. To reiterate, the Federal
Circuit concluded that “pain is an impairment because it
diminishes the body’s ability to function, and that pain need
not be diagnosed as connected to a current underlying

265. Id. at 6–7.
266. Id. at 7.
267. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (2021).
268. Id.
269. See Stressor Determinations for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 75 Fed.
Reg. 39,843 (July 13, 2010) (final rule) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)).
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condition to function as an impairment.” 270
Keep in mind the extreme specificity of the Regulations
relating to the Ratings Schedule: even with the ability to
enumerate hundreds of identifiable disabilities, there are
still cases, such as in Saunders, where the Regulations fail
to adequately capture the experience of someone who is
clearly in need of disability benefits assistance. Contrast this
with the “Mental Disorders” category, which lists only a few
disabilities and forces the Raters to compare a veteran’s
experience with an extremely limited set of symptoms that
are not specific to that disorder or that individual.
Taking the next step, then, if a symptom diminishes the
mind’s ability to function, that symptom need not be
diagnosed as connected to the current underlying condition
in order to count as an impairment, according to Saunders.
This could be helpful to veterans with certain disabilities,
where symptoms may not perfectly map on to the criteria in
the regulations.
Furthermore, it seems to be the case that there are large
numbers of veterans who have a private diagnosis but who
are not able to either reproduce that diagnosis for the VA, or
who do not experience the exact symptoms listed in the
Ratings Schedule. 271 A proxy of “mental pain” or distress
could be used at the diagnosis and initial claim stage, which
is where many of these cases are knocked out. 272 Because
PTSD can be difficult to diagnose and in fact veterans with
PTSD may be avoiding treatment for a variety of reasons,
“mental pain” that results in an impaired function could help
to capture that group. In addition, since the regulatory
270. Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
271. This is somewhat anecdotal, in that there seem to be many claims at the
R.O. level that are denied and not appealed. There may be many more that never
even make it to the claim stage.
272. Close to 30 percent of claims are denied at the Board level, for example.
U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFFS., BOARD OF VETERANS APPEALS ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR (FY) 2020, at 38 (2020), https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans
_Annual_Rpts/BVA2020AR.pdf.
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scheme is woefully lacking, there are potentially other
mental disorders that could be captured by using “pain” as
an imputed catchall provision.
2. Argument for Parity from the Saunders Court
The Saunders court said that “pain need not be
diagnosed as connected to a current underlying condition to
function as an impairment.” 273 It went on to assert:
The VA’s disability rating regulations also treat pain as a form of
functional impairment. For example, 38 C.F.R. § 4.10 reads that
“[t]he basis of disability evaluations is the ability of the body as a
whole, or of the psyche, or of a system or organ of the body to
function under the ordinary conditions of daily life including
employment.” We have explained that the “functional loss”
regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 4.40, “makes clear that functional loss may
be due to pain and that pain may render a part seriously
disabled.” 274

Furthermore, the Saunders court explicitly points to
PTSD as one disorder that we do not fully understand and
that medical science might be slow to catch up on, saying that
in “some situations, such as for post-traumatic stress
disorder, herbicide exposure in Vietnam, and unexplained
illnesses affecting Middle East veterans, medical science
simply has been unable, as of yet, to diagnose the disabling
impact of service for veterans affected by these
conditions.” 275
If science has not yet been able to “diagnose the disabling
impact,” then it seems that over-reliance and strict
adherence even to the DSM would not always be appropriate,
and certainly not to the regulations which treat every single
mental disorder on the same ratings scale.
The Regulatory scheme for “mental disorders” largely
utilizes symptoms and terminology that may be appropriate
273. Saunders, 886 F.3d at 1364.
274. Id. (quoting Thompson v. McDonald, 815 F.3d 781, 785–86 (Fed. Cir.
2016)) (internal citations omitted).
275. Id. at 1367 (emphasis added).
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for mood disorders and schizophrenia, but not for anxiety
disorders and PTSD. 276 Certainly, the regulations need to
change dramatically. However, in lieu of sweeping
regulatory change which is unlikely to happen in short order,
the Veterans Court or a subsequent appellate court should
use the broadness of the Saunders case to remedy some of
these issues.
Saunders opened the door for disabilities to be examined
not just on the basis of diagnosis as it relates to the ratings
schedule, but also along the axis of functional impairment. If
courts use functional impairment as the criteria for assessing
whether mental disorders are disabilities, then cases
involving mental disorders would be much more likely to be
found disabling and thus eligible for compensation.
CONCLUSION
The disability status of pain, and chronic pain in
particular, is fraught. The Saunders case is an important
first step in recognizing pain as a disability. When the causes
of disability are uncertain, the experience subjective, and the
mechanisms complex, 277 there should be a nuanced legal
response to that complexity.

276. Bryan A. Liang & Mark S. Boyd, PTSD in Returning Wounded Warriors:
Ensuring Medically Appropriate Evaluation and Legal Representation Through
Legislative Reform, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 193 (2011).
277. IPRCC PAIN STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 27, at 23.

